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TOTAL ECLIPSE OF THE COURT? JANUS V. AFSCME, COUNCIL 31 IN
HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY CONTEXTS
Sarah W. Cudahy* William A. Herbert,** & John F. Wirenius**. '
INTRODUCTION
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court are all too often
treated as dispositive of more than just the discrete legal question posed
to and answered by the Court, but also of political decisions surrounding,
but not necessarily precluded by, the Court's ruling. Moreover, the decisions are often read and interpreted in an ahistorical manner, ignoring the
political, social, and economic forces underlying, and sometimes undermining, them.
The Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,2 for example,declared unconstitutional state-mandated segregation in schools, but
the battle to eliminate racial discrimination in education, employment, and
housing was waged and continues to be fought not just before the courts,

* Sarah W. Cudahy is the Executive Director and General Counsel of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board. Sarah graduated from Boston University and Washington University in St.
Louis School of Law.
** William A. Herbert is a Distinguished Lecturer at Hunter College, CUNY and Executive Director
of the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions.
Bill graduated from the University of Buffalo and earned his law degree from the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
*** John F. Wirenius is the Chairperson of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board.
John is a graduate of Foidham University and the Columbia University School of Law.
1. The authors would like to thank Sarah Coleman of the New York Public Employment Relations Board as well as John Henry and Jacob May of the Indiana Education Employment Relations
Board for their assistance on this article. In addition, they wish to thank New York City Department
of RecQrds and Information Services Assistant Commissioner Ken Cobb for his assistance in accessing materials from the New York City Municipal Archives. This article is an expanded version of a
paper initially prepared for the Taylor Law @ 50 Conference on May 10-11, 2018 that was organized
by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board, Cornell ILR, and the New York State
Bar Association Labor and Employment Section.
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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but also in the political arena, at the federal, state, and local levels.3 Likewise, the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 4 far from finally resolving all
of the questions concerning the legal status of abortion, has spawned a
series of test cases (leading to Roe 's significant modification by the Court
itself'), political battles, and state legislation that is in tension with the
Court's own recent rulings in the field, and yet which the Court declined
to review. 6
In both the context of Brown and of Roe, finality was not achieved
by judicial fiat. Forces opposed to those rulings waged legislative, political, and litigation campaigns against them.7 The reaction to the decisions
by the stakeholders-state and local governments, political parties and actors, and the people themselves, can cement a decision into the judicial
pantheon while its mandate is thwarted in actuality. Absent enforcement,
adherence, and ultimately acceptance, a judicial decision can diminish, by
degrees, into a footnote or be overturned by a future court with justices
who have different values, perspectives, and experiences. The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Janus v. American Federationof State, County,
and MunicipalEmployees, Council 31 ("Janus")8 is a perfect example.9
The same factors can be found at work from the very different perspectives of the right-to-work state of Indiana, and the comprehensive labor relations statutes governing both the public and private sectors in New

3.
See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.BOARD OFEDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 774-78 (1976); CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER
BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 13 (2004).

4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-77 (1992);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146-47, 156-160 (2007).
6. Planned Parenthood of Arkansas & Eastern Oklahoma v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir.,
2017) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2573 (2018). The Arkansas law at issue in Jegley is strikingly similar
to that found unconstitutional in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310-18
(2016).
7.
KLUGER, supra note 3, at 751-787; CLOTFELTER, supra note 3; Robert Lowe, Richard
Kluger's Simple Justice After Twenty-Nine Years: Simple Justice, 44 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 125, 125-132
(2004); see also MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015).
8.
Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
9. See William A. Herbert, Public Sector Labor Law and History: The Politics of-Ancient
History?, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 335, 336 (2011) ("The long-term existence of enforceable
legal rights, like collective bargaining, has the tendency to cause complacency and an expectation of
perpetuity. At the same time, committed opponents of such rights, and their descendants, await circumstances that provide an opportunity to end or substantially limit those rights. Over time, the historical, political, and economic forces that gave rise to the birth of the rights ate frequently forgotten
by both proponents and opponents. Therefore, the potential adverse consequences of eliminating or
substantially changing established rights, including the resurrection of old problems and injustices,

and the creation of new ones, are frequently absent from debate.").
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York State, one of the most densely unionized state in the Nation.1 ° In
both states, the Janus decision, or even Indiana's "right to work" law, does
not automatically sound the death knell for public sector unions and collective bargaining." Rather, the next chapter will be written by public
officials, unions and public employees, both union members and nonmembers, advocacy groups, and voters, as well as by the courts. 12 Far
from being settled, the future is all to play for, and, to paraphrase Mark
Twain, the predictions of organized labor's demise may prove to be
greatly exaggerated. 13 Public sector collective bargaining was born at a
time of labor militancy, and a consequence of the Janus case may prove
to be the reemergence of an active and spirited form of public sector ac14
tivism.
In this article, we give an account of the rise and institutionalization
of the agency shop, and its sudden and swift fall from the graces of the
very judicial body that extended it as recently as 2009. We then give an
account of the functioning-in many ways surprisingly robust--of unions
and of union density in Indiana, and of the effect on loss of agency fee
rights. From there, we examine the ways states have reacted to Janussome anticipating its outcome with prophylactic legislation to protect stable collective bargaining relationships, and ameliorative proposals that are
pending before similarly pro-public sector collective bargaining states.
We finally examine other ways states and state actors may act in response
to the Janus decision, and other possible ramifications of the case.

See The Economics Daily:Hawaii and New York hadhighest union membership rates, the
10.
Carolinas the lowest, in 2018. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/hawaii-and-new-york-had-highest-union-membership-rates-thecarolinas-the-lowest-in-2018.htm bls-print.
11.
See Josh Edelson, Koch Brothers-Linked Group Declares New War on Unions,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (June 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2018-06twitter impression--true.
27/koch-brothers-linked-group-declares-new-war-on-unions?
12. Sarah Cudahy, James Roemer, Kate Luscombe & John Wirenius, Strategiesfor Adapting
to a Post-Janus World, in THE TAYLOR LAW AT 50: PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS IN A
SHIFTING LANDSCAPE (John F. Wirenius, ed.) at 207-45 (2019).
13.
See Catherine L. Fisk and Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 Cal L. Rev. (forthcoming
2019), archived at https:/lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/2019-fisk-c-malin-m-afterjanus-clr107.pdf (visited April 15, 2019); see also Richard A. Greenwald, After Janus, Labor Is In a Deep
2018),
30,
Could Dig Itself Out, DAILY BEAST (June
Hole. Here's How It
https://www.thedailybeast.com/after-janus-labor-is-in-a-deep-hole-heres-how-it-could-dig-itselfout.
14. Fisk & Malin,supra note 13, at 53-64; see also Justin Miller, Janus:A New Attack Presents
Old Challengesfor Unions, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 24, 2017) http://prospect.org/article/janus-new-attack-presents-old-challenges-unions (last visited July 11, 2018).
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EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE AGENCY SHOP

The development of the agency shop, and the subsequent evolution
of constitutional limitations on such fees, may best be viewed as a conflict
between two models. One reflects the institutionalization of public policies favoring collective bargaining and exclusive representation as means
of ensuring labor peace, while the second reflects a backlash favoring a
highly individualistic model antithetical to collective bargaining, and ultimately seeking to weaken the bargaining and/or political power of labor. 15 The rise, and subsequent fall, of the agency shop, though, do not
stand in a vacuum.
A. Open v. Closed Shop
For over a century, there have been concerted efforts to mandate an
open shop in unionized workplaces. 6 The movement to impose the open
shop began in the late 1 9 th century and early 2 0 th century in response to
the rise of stronger private sector unions. 17 From the start, the movement
was an effort led by employer associations like the National Association
of Manufacturers, which insisted that the open shop was constitutionally
mandated. 18
The original target of the movement was the elimination of the closed
shop, in which union membership is mandated as a condition of initial and
continued employment.' 9 In a closed shop, the employer is prohibited
from hiring anyone who is not already a union member and cannot retain

15. See H. E. Hoagland, Closed Shop Versus Open Shop, 8 THE AM. ECON. REV. 752, 753-56
(1918) (discussing the difference between open and closed shops).
16. CHAD PEARSON, Employers' Associations and Open Shops in the United States, OXFORD
RES.
ENCYCLOPEDIAS
OF
AM.
HIST.
(Feb.
2018),
http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/1 0. 1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-459.
17. GILBERT J. GALL, THE POLITICS OF RIGHT TO WORK: THE LABOR FEDERATIONS As
SPECIAL INTERESTS, 1943-1979, at 3-4 (1988); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 269-275

(1987).
18.

WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 64

(Harvard Univ. Press ed., 1991); Allen M. Wakstein, The Origins of the Open Shop Movement, 19191920, 51 J. OF AM. HIST. 460, 460 (1964). See Henry White, The Issue of the Open and Closed Shop,
180 N. AM. REV. 28, 30 (1905) (quoting the Pittsburgh convention of the National Association of
Manufacturers) ("The employees have the right to contract for their services in a collective capacity,
but any contract that contains a stipulation that employment shall be denied to men not parties to the
contract is an invasion of the constitutional rights of the American workman, is against public policy,
and is in violation of the conspiracy laws. This Association declares its unalterable antagonism to the
closed shop, and insists that the doors of no industry shall be closed against American workmen because of their membership or non-membership in any labor organization.").
19. See White, supra note 18, at 28-29; Wakstein, supra note 18, at 462, 463, 466, 467, 470.
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that employee if membership lapses."0 The closed shop was a product of
private sector skilled trade unions in the 19 th century. 21 The primary exception was printer unions with relatively small percentages of public sector members who sought a closed shop to protect the standards of their
22
entire membership.
From the beginning, the goal of the open shop movement was to diminish union strength in the workplace.23 One historian has described the
movement as "a power struggle between employers wishing to assert their
a
domination and employees desiring, through stronger unions, to have
24
greater share in those decisions of management that affected them.,
One of the earliest articulations of an equitable argument against the
open shop was made by American Federation of Labor President Samuel
Gompers in 1905: "[I]f a man desires to participate in the benefits resulting from an agreement which our unions obtain with our employers, that
with every union man
man assumes, or should assume, equal obligations
25
agreement.,
that
of
responsibility
the
bear
to
President Theodore Roosevelt substantially aided the movement
with his imposition of an open shop policy for the unionized United States
Government Printing Office.2 6 Roosevelt's unilateral action ended a
closed shop practice at that federal office.2 7 In a 1903 letter to Secretary
of Commerce and Labor George B. Cortelyou objecting to the firing of an
assistant foreman because of the foreman's expulsion from the bookbinders' union, President Roosevelt outlined his reason for supporting an open
shop:
But I am President of the United States and my business
is to see fair play among all men, capitalists or wageworkers, whether they conduct their private business as
individuals or as members of organizations. The office in
20. See White, supranote 18, at 28.
21.
T. STOCKTON, THE CLOSED SHOP IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS, 17-32 (1911).
Id. at 160-61 (citing evidence that government employees in the building trades engaged
22.
in strikes seeking a closed shop); DAVID ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES 165 (1940).
23.
See Samuel Gompers, Talks on Labor, AM. FEDERATIONST, Aug. 1905, at 521 (referencing the president of the Manufacturers' Association of the United States as the most prominent spokesperson against union security who publicly advocated for the elimination of unions in the United
States).
24. Wakstein, supra note 18, at 465.
25.
Samuel Gompers, The Open Shop, in THE JOURNEYMAN BARBER, HAIRDRESSER AND
COSMETOLOGIST 176, 177 (1905).
26. EDMUND MORIS, THEODORE REX, 271-72 (2001).
27. STERLING D. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER, 378-82 (1948).
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question is under the civil service law. Admission thereto
and retention therein must be in accordance with the civil
services rules, and also, I may add, in accordance with the
principles upon which our Government was established
and is now carried on. There is not the slightest objection
to the members of the force belonging to a labor union;
indeed, I should rather favor them as belonging. But there
must be no compulsion of any kind brought to bear upon
them to force them to belong, and the Government,
through its agents must act with absolutely even-handed
justice toward all its employees, just as it does toward all
citizens.2 8
The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 191 229 was the first major statute to
protect the collective rights of public workers. It overturned executive
orders issued by President Roosevelt and his successor William Howard
Taft prohibiting federal workers, individually or collectively, from petitioning Congress concerning their salaries
and benefits and it protected
30
the right of postal workers to join unions.
The period of the First World War saw a partial decline in open shop
advocacy. 31 The primary source for the decline was Wilsonian government policies that emphasized industrial democracy and provided certain
protections that helped enable workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining. 32 The war-related policies increased the strength and militancy of labor at the end of the war.3 3 The scope of that militancy is
revealed in three major strikes in 1919: the Great Steel Strike, the Seattle
general strike, and the Boston police strike.34
In the 1920's, the National Association of Manufacturers began a
28.

Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to George B. Cortelyou, (July 13, 1903), Theo-

dore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division, https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?liblD=o1 85339.
29. Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012).
30. William A. Herbert, The Chill of a Wintry Light: Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieriand the
Right to Petition in Public Employment, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 592-94 (2012).

31. GALL, supra note 17, at 4; Wakstein, supra note 18, at 461.
32. GALL, supra note 17, at 4 ("The federal government's industrial relations regulations during World War I, fostered by the need for uninterrupted industrial production, led in short order to a
quasi-collective bargaining system in many segments of the economy formerly operating on an open
shop basis."). See also JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR'S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912-1921,

at 14-18 (1997).
33. Wakstein, supra note 18, at 461-462.
34. SPERO, supra note 27, at 251; Wakstein, supra note 18, at 462, 465-66.
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coordinated campaign in support of the open shop.3 5 The employer organization played a central role in disseminating open shop advocacy materials nationwide.36
The now outlawed closed shop provides the strongest form of union
security.3 7 In a union shop, an employee is obligated to join the union
within a fixed time period after being hired and continue that membership
as a condition of employment.38 Under a maintenance of membership
provision, an employee is not obligated to become a union member.3 9
However, if the employee elects to join the union he or she must remain
a member during the duration of the contract.4 °
Efforts to ban or substantially restrict union security by open shop
proponents on the state level pre-date the enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act in 1947, which among other things granted states the power to modify
federal labor policy concerning union security. 4 ' As Elizabeth Tandy
Shermer has noted "[t]he earliest right-to-work referenda were in the
South and Southwest. 4 2 Promoters of the open shop were business leaders in such industries as agriculture, mining, tourism, and gambling.43
State constitutional "right to work" amendments were approved in
Arkansas and Florida in 1944. 44 In 1946, similar amendments were approved in Arizona and Nebraska. 45 A number of states including Virginia,
Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia and Iowa had statutory "right to
work" mandates at the time Taft-Hartley was enacted. 46 Laws in Colorado and Wisconsin mandated a favorable vote of 75% of a bargaining

'

35.
GALL, supra note 17, at 5.
IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 192036.
1933, at 156 (1969).
GALL, supra note 17, at 10 n.3.
37.
Charles E. Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 478, 478 n. 2.
38.
Id.;
39.
Jay W. Waks, Impact of the Agency Shop on Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 547, 547, n.2 (1970).
40. Id.
41.
GALL, supra note 17, at 13; Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §157
(1947).
42.
ELIZABETH TANDY SHERMER, "Is FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL UN-AMERICAN?' RIGHTTO-WORK CAMPAIGNS AND ANTI-UNION CONSERVATISM, 1943-1958 at 115 in THE RIGHT AND
LABOR IN AMERICA: POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND IMAGINATION (Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth
Tandy Shermer, Eds.) (2012).

43.

Id.

44.
45.

GALL, supra note 17, at 19-20.
Id.at 20.

46. Id.See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 100 (1963) ("By the time
§14(b) was written into the Act, twelve States had statutes or constitutional provisions outlawing or
restricting the closed shop and related devices"); NAT'L RIGHT TO WORK COMM., STATE RIGHT TO
WORK TIMELINE, https://nrtwc.org/facts-issues/state-right-to-work-timeline-2016/ (last visited Nov.

2, 2018).
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unit concerning a union security clause before it would be enforceable.47
Taft-Hartley amended Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
to grant employees the right to refrain from engaging in union activities
or activities for mutual aid and protection "except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment." 48 Section 8(a)(3) prohibited
the closed shop but permitted negotiated agreements that imposed a union
shop or a maintenance of membership requirement.49
In section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley, Congress eliminated federal
preemption over state "right to work" laws by providing that the federal
labor relations statute shall not "be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."' 50 It
took many years before the Supreme Court resolved the questions of
whether a negotiated agency fee provision was a lawful form of union
security under Taft-Hartley, and subject to Section 14(b) and state "right
to work" laws.5 1
By the 1950s, private sector union leaders understood that:
[w]ith constant turnover, unions might experience a rising
proportion of non-members at the workplace and, the
election statistics seemed to suggest, some unions could
lose up to 15 percent of their membership while still having to represent those workers in collective bargaining
and grievance handling. Even worse, the subsequent dues
decline would drain resources from other valued pro52
grams.

47.

Memorandum on State Statutes Pertaining to Wage Assignments, Check-Off of Union

Dues, and Union Security, in THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NAT'L WAR LABOR BOARD:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND WAGE STABILIZATION IN WARTIME, 450 (May 17, 1944).

48. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1947).
49. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3).
50. 29 U.S.C. §158; GALL, supra note 17, at 60.
51.
See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963) (concluding that an agency
shop proposal sought to condition "employment upon the practical equivalent of union 'membership,'

as Congress used that term in the provision to §8(a)(3)" of the Taft-Hartley Act); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 97-98 (1963) (holding that a negotiated agency fee provision

was subject to § 14(b) of Taft-Hartley, and Florida's right to work law).
52. GALL, supra note 17, at 60.
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United Auto Workers ("UAW") President Walter Reuther warned
against the "tragic tactical mistake" of fighting "right to work" laws "on
a purely negative defensive basis. '53 He urged, instead, that the fight be
on a "positive basis in which we put all these issues in their proper relationship[,] one to the other[,] and then equate them with the forces pushing
the 'right to work' laws."54
B. Neither Open Nor Closed. The Agency Fee Compromise
The agency shop was originally developed in private sector negotiations in the 1940's, and it is one of the weakest forms of union security.55
In an agency shop, a non-member employee is obligated to pay a fair share
toward the costs of collective negotiations and contract administration.56
union repIt is well-recognized that the duties associated with collective
5
resentation "entails the expenditure of considerable funds." 1
The primary rationale for the agency shop stems from the legal structure of collective bargaining in the United States. Virtually all collective
bargaining statutes mandate a certified or recognized union to be the exclusive representative of all employees in a bargaining unit. Adoption of
this model by Congress and the States was based on a determination that
it is necessary for effective collective bargaining. Under the exclusive
representation model, a union can face liability and litigation costs when
its duty of fair representaa non-member asserts that the union breached
58
tion by acting arbitrarily or discriminatorily.
Voluntary recognition of public sector unions for purposes of collective bargaining, however, existed before the enactment of state and local
public sector collective bargaining laws. 59 A 1955 study by the New York
53.
54.

Id. at 105.
Id.

55.

Hopfl, supra note 38, at 478. Arguably, dues deduction checkoff is the weakest form of

union security.
56. Id.
57. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991).
58. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-256 (1944) ("The duties of a bargaining agent

selected under the terms of the Act extend beyond the mere representation of the interests of its own
group members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and impartially. Otherwise, employees who are not members of a selected union at the time it is chosen by the majority
would be left without adequate representation."). See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944) (holding that a union violates its duty of fair representation by discriminating
against bargaining unit members based on race).
59.

See CITY OF N.Y., DEP'T OF LABOR, EXTENT OF RECOGNITION AND THE BARGAINING UNIT

INPUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 8-9 (1960) (citing twenty-six public employer survey responses stating that
they had recognized a union as the exclusive representative for all employees in bargaining units.).
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City Department of Labor found that the exclusive representation model
of recognition was the most common with certain public employers limiting recognition to members-only unions. 60 The study cited the University of Illinois as having "[o]ne of the most complete programs," dating
back to the 1940s, for
recognizing unions to represent university non-ac61
ademic employees.
In the period before the enactment of public sector collective bargaining laws, union security was the subject of negotiations in contracts
for government workers. 62 The New York City Department of Labor
study found that ten out of forty-two public employers with recognized
unions nationwide had negotiated a union shop or a maintenance of membership provision in their agreements.63 By 1962, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") had negotiated dozens of collective bargaining agreements that included union
security provisions. 64 At the same time, a top assistant to the AFSCME
President insisted that "[s]o-called 'right-to-work' legislation, fought
See also Herbert W. Cornell, Collective BargainingBy Public Employee Groups, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
43, 43 (1958) (citing 122 bilateral collectively negotiated agreements in the public sector); William
A. Herbert, The History Books Tell It? Collective Bargainingin HigherEducation in the 1940s, 9 J.
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INTHE ACAD., 1 (2017) (referencing public sector collective bargaining
agreements in the 1940s with the Tennessee Valley Authority, the University of Akron, municipalities
and school districts).
60. CITY OF N.Y., DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 59, at 7-10, 12-14 (Among the larger public
employers cited in the study with members only bargaining units were Philadelphia, Louisville, and
the transit systems in Boston, Cleveland and Seattle.). In devising New York City's original system
of collective bargaining, the New York City Department of Labor established a compromise between
exclusive and plural representational models. Under that compromise, the certified union functioned
as the exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining and grievance administration.
However, minority unions representing individuals in bargaining units had an opportunity to present
their own views on issues to municipal officials. See CITY OF N.Y., DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON A
PROGRAM OF LABOR RELATIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES, 84-85, 94 (June 1957).

61. CITY OF N.Y. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 59, at 11; see also William A. Herbert, The
History Books Tell It? Collective Bargainingin Higher Education in the 1940s, supra, note 59 (describing the development of the University of Illinois program and other early examples of voluntary
public sector collective bargaining).
62. Richard B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE
41,41 (1986).
63. CITY OF N.Y. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 59, at 17-18 (The study identified the following
public employers with negotiated union security provisions: Chicago Transit Authority; Kenton
County, Kentucky; Dover, New Hampshire; Kewanee, Illinois; Berlin, New Hampshire; Cloquette,
Minnesota; Nashua, New Hampshire; Aberdeen School District 5, Washington; East St. Louis, Illinois; and Woonsocket, Rhode Island.).
64. LEO KRAMER, LABOR'S PARADOx: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COuNTY, AND
MUNICtPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 45-46 (1962) (stating that AFSCME had fifty-two agreements

with a union shop, thirty with a "modified union shop," forty-five with a maintenance of membership
provision, six with a modified preferential form of maintenance of membership, and two with a preferential hiring provision).
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bitterly by other unions, has at times proved beneficial to the AFSCME...
and AFSCME remains a movement which employees can enter and leave
at will."65
The massive growth of public sector unionization followed enactment of public sector collective bargaining laws and regulations beginning in the late 1950s. In New York,6 6 Michigan,6 v and other states,6 8 the
right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining was extended to public sector employees. Those laws granted the related rights to freely associate over workplace issues, and to participate in collective bargaining
over terms and conditions of employment.69
Overall union density in government employment quadrupled nationwide following enactment of those laws. 7 0 This surge in unionization
has been analogized to the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations
in the 1930s. 71 The rapid rise of public sector unionization took place
under many state and local statutes that did not recognize union security
as a statutory right or a subject of negotiations.7 2

'

65. Id. at 2.
66. New York Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, ch. 392, 1967 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 396
(McKinney). Public sector collective bargaining in New York City began in the late 1950s pursuant
to an executive order issued by Mayor Robert F. Wagner. See Exec. Order No. 49 (Mar. 31, 1958),
reprinted in Labor Relations Programfor Employees of the City ofNew York, 12 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 371, 618-25 (1959).
67. Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, MicH. COMP. LAWS § 423.201 (2012).
68. E.g., New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13a-2 (West
2018); Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.101 (1970); Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act, MINN. STAT. § 179.61 (1971).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13a-2 (West 2018); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §1101.101 (1970); MINN.
STAT. § 179.61 (1971).

70. Freeman, supra note 62, at 44-49.
71. Joseph A. McCartin, "A WagnerActfor PublicEmployees": Labor'sDeferredDream and
the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1976, 98 J. OF AM. HIST. 123, 123 (2008).
72.
See Foltz v. City of Dayton, 272 N.E.2d 169, 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a
municipality did not have the legal authority to agree to a collective bargaining provision requiring it
to dismiss an employee for failing to pay membership dues or a service charge.); Farrigan v. Helsby,
68 Misc.2d 952 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Alb. Co., 1971), aff'd, 42 A.D. 2d 265,267, (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't,
1973) (affirming an agency determination that a proposal for an agency shop was a prohibited subject
of negotiations because public employees had the right to refrain from participating in union activities
under state collective bargaining law); N.J. Tpk. Emps' Union, Local 194 v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 303
A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1973) aff'd319 A.2d 224, 225 (1974) (finding that a negotiated agency fee provision violated the statutory right of public employees to refrain from engaging
in union activity); PLRB v. Zelem, 329 A.2d 477, 477 (Pa. 1974) (sustaining a challenge by a university employee to a negotiated agency fee provision because it was not authorized under the state collective bargaining law); State Emps' Ass'n of N.H. v. Mills, 344 A.2d 6, 7 (1975) (concluding that
that agency fee was unlawful based on the inclusion of a "right to work" provision in the state statute
protecting the right of public employees from refraining from forming, joining or assisting a union);
City of Hayward v. United Public Emps', Local 390, 126 Ca. Rptr. 710, 714 (1976) (holding that an
agreement requiring non-members to pay an agency fee equivalent to membership dues violated the
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A May 1973 study of union security in the public sector found only
two states, Hawaii and Rhode Island, mandated an agency shop and seven
other laws permitted the subject to be negotiated into an agreement. 7 ' The
1973 study also identified two collective bargaining laws that expressly
authorized a union shop and two others allowed the negotiations of a
maintenance of membership provision.74 In contrast, the study found that
most public sector bargaining laws and regulations permitted dues deduc75
tion checkoff.
Indeed, most early state and local laws replicated the policy under
President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 11491, which stated that
negotiated agreements for federal employees shall not "require an employee to become or to remain a member of a labor organization, or to pay

right of employees to not participate in the union as well as the prohibition against discrimination
against public employees for exercising their statutory rights; Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teachers
Ass'n, 380 A.2d 186, 186, 191-93 (Me. 1977) (concluding that a mandatory agency fee constituted
coercion in favor of membership or participation in a union in violation of the Maine Municipal Public
Employees Labor Relations Law).
73.
See JOYCE M. NAJITA & DENNIS T. OGAWA, GUIDE To STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: UNION SECURITY, 2-4, 8-22 (setting forth the small number of state and local laws that required an agency shop or permitted the negotiation of an agency fee
and a list of states and localities that required or permitted an agency fee shop and other forms of
union security.). Hawaii enacted Act 171, § 4 in 1970, mandating an agency shop without the need
for negotiations. The provision stated:
The employer shall, upon receiving from an exclusive representative a written
statement which specifies an amount of reasonable service fees necessary to
defray the costs for its services rendered in negotiating and administering an
agreement and computed on a pro rata basis among all employees within its
appropriate bargaining unit, deduct from the payroll of every employee in the
appropriate bargaining unit the amount of service fees and remit the amount to
the exclusive representative. A deduction permitted by this section, as determined by the board to be reasonable, shall extend to any employee organization
chosen as the exclusive representative of an appropriate bargaining unit. If an
employee organization is no longer the exclusive representative of the appropriate bargaining unit, the deduction shall terminate.
Joyce M. Najita, The Mandatory Agency Shop in Hawaii's Public Sector, 27 INDUS. LAB REL. REV.
432; 432-35. In 1973, Rhode Island amended its law concerning state government employees to require nonmembers to pay a fee concerning negotiations and the administration of contracts. The case
was litigated and the court upheld the legality of an agency fee under that state's public sector statute;
See Town of North Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 297 A.2d 342, 345 (R.I., 1972)
(concluding that the applicable statute was ambiguous concerning an agency shop and upholding an
interest arbitration award mandating an agency fee provision "which neither requires a nonjoiner to
share in expenditures or benefits he is not entitled to receive, nor exacts from him more than a proportionate share of the costs of securing the benefits conferred upon all members of the bargaining
unit.").
74. See NAJITA & OGAWA, supra note 73 at 2.
75. Id.at 1-5.
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money to the organization except pursuant to a voluntary, written authorization by a member for the payment of dues through payroll deductions. ,,76
Many judicial and administrative rulings around the country concluded that the agency shop violated state statutory language granting
public employees the right to refrain from joining or participating in union
activity. For example, New Jersey courts ruled that a negotiated agency
shop fee violated the right of public employees to refrain from engaging
in union activity. 77 The New Jersey litigation stemmed from a 1970 collective bargaining agreement wherein the parties agreed to test the legality
78
of an agency shop through the vehicle of a declaratory judgment action.
The legal uncertainty of the agency shop was reflected in the parties'
agreement to test the legality of the provision in court.7 9
As Joseph A. McCartin has pointed out the prohibition against the
agency shop "meant that public sector unions, like their private sector
80
counterparts in 'right to work' states, faced the problem of 'free riders'."
The lack of union security protections under most of the originally
enacted public sector statutes does not appear to have diminished the organizing by public workers that led to the massive unionization growth.8"
The growth was the direct result of concerted organizing and militancy by
public employees and their unions. 82 In 1972, a negotiated agency fee
provision in Michigan was found to be prohibited under that state's Public
Employment Relations Act. 83 The subsequent 1973 Michigan statutory
amendment to permit negotiated agency fee procedures laid the groundwork for the decision in Abood v. DetroitBoardofEducation8 4 four years
85
later.

76. Exec. Order No. 11491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (Oct. 29, 1969). The federal sector experience
without the agency shop was cited by Justice Alito in the majority opinion in Janus, at 2466.
77. N.J. Tpk. Emps.' Union, Local 194 v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 303 A.2d 599, 604 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div., 1973) affd 319 A.2d 224, 225 (1974).
at601.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. McCartin, supra note 71 at 126-27.
81. Id.at127.
82. Id.at 123, 139.
83. Smigel v. Southgate Cmty. Sch. Dist., 202 N.W.2d 305, 307-08 (Mich. 1972).
84. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
85. Id.at 214-15. The 1973 amendment stated:
[N]othing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer from making an
agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative as defined in section 11 to require as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit pay to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount of dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative ....
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C. A Closer Look: The Agency Shop History in New York
In 1966, the Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations,
appointed by New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, issued a Final
Report recommending legislation that would ultimately become the Taylor Law. 86 The Committee's recommendations included membership
dues "check-off upon presentation by individual employees of dues deduction authorization cards." 87 The Final Report did not recommend other
forms of union security such as a union or agency shop although they were
discussed by witnesses who testified at the Committee's public hearing on
March 4, 1966.
At the hearing, AFSCME District 37 Executive Director Victor Gotbaum referenced the existence of union shops and agency fees in other
jurisdictions.8 8 Two labor attorneys urged the Committee to recommend
a union shop for New York's public sector to deter strikes and to ensure
that unions had enough resources to provide representation.89
The Committee's Report, however, recommended "a statutory declaration of public policy be made that public employees have the right to
join or refrainfromjoiningemployee organizations of their own choosing
for purposes of collectively negotiating the terms of their employment." 90
In the enacted Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, known as the
"Taylor Law" after George Taylor, who headed the Committee, the dues
deduction and the "refrain from" language were incorporated. 91
Not only did the Taylor Law not provide for agency fees, but in 1970,
the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) found
that proposing an agency shop in negotiations was unlawful, "on the
ground, [among others,] that an agency shop would infringe upon the right
granted to all public employees by the State Legislature in [Taylor Law]
§ 202 wherein public employees were granted the right to refrain from
forming, joining, or participating in any employee organization., 92 In af-

86.

GOVERNOR'S COMMI'IrEE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FrNAL REPORT, 9 (1966).
87. Id.at 32.
88.
Testimony of Victor Gotbaum, State of N.Y. Governor's Committee on Public Employee
Relations Hearing at 217-18 (March 4, 1966) (on file with Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, Cornell University Library, David Lawrence Cole Papers, box 14).
89. Testimony of Ernest Fleischman and David A. Simon, State of N.Y. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations Hearing at 249-50, 261-63 (March 4, 1966) (on file with Kheel
Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, Cornell University Library David Lawrence Cole Papers, box 14).
90. Id.at 31 (emphasis added).
91.
See New York Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, supra, note 66.
92. Monroe-Woodbury Bd. of Education, 3 N.Y. PERB 3104 (1970).
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firming PERB's determination, the Appellate Division, Third Department, explained that an employee "may not be compelled to form, join or
participate in the petitioner's association. Therefore, any forced payment
of dues or their equivalent would be in violation of the law as constituting,
' 93
at the very least, participation in an employee organization."
The effort to permit an agency shop in New York State was initiated
by New York's largest public employer, the City of New York. 9 4 It was
uniquely situated to advocate for the agency shop based on its near decade-long experience with repeated strikes under a collective bargaining
program that did not include union security.9 5
Less than a year after the Taylor Law became effective, the New
York City Office of the Corporation Counsel issued a memorandum examining a proposed requirement for non-union members in a municipal
bargaining unit to pay a representation fee. 9 6 The proposed fee would
have covered the costs associated with negotiating a contract, administering the agreement, and processing grievances. 97 The memorandum described the history, policy, and legal issues surrounding the agency shop
in the private and public sectors. 98 It concluded that the agency fee in the
public sector would be unlawful under New York law, based on the Taylor
Law's right of public employees to refrain from joining or participating in
a union, and the lack of union security provisions in the law. 99 In addition,
it referenced another state law that mandated that dues deduction author100
izations be revocable at any time.
In September 1968, the New York City Office of Labor Relations'
General Counsel expressed support for changing the Taylor Law to permit
an agency shop.10 1 At the time, the agency shop was a major bargaining
demand of the Unified Federation of Teachers in negotiations aimed at

-

93.
Farrigan v. Helsby, 42 A.D.2d 265,267 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't).
94. Memorandum from the Office of the Corp. Counsel to the Labor Policy Comm., to the
Office of the Mayor at 11-15 (July 9, 1968) (on file with City of New York Department of Records
& Information Services, Municipal Archives, John V. Lindsay Files, Box 58, Folder 1094 Labor Policy - Agency Shop 1968-1969).
95.
See, Exec. Order No. 49, supra, note 66.
96. Memorandum from Office of the Corporation Counsel to Labor Policy Committee, supra
at note 94.

97.

Id. at 6.

98.
Id. at 1-6, 11-12.
99.
Id. at 11, 13.
100. Id. at 15.
101.
Memorandum from Philip J. Ruffo to Herbert J. Haber on proposed changes to the Taylor
Law at 4-5 (Sept. 23, 1968) (on file with City of New York Department of Records & Information
Services, Municipal Archives, John V. Lindsay Files, Box 59, Folder 1098 Labor Policy - Taylor
Law 1968-1969).
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ending the 1968
Ocean Hill-Brownsville strike that closed the New York
10 2
City schools.

The 1969 legislative program of the New York Select Joint Legislative Committee on Public Employee Relations included a proposal to
amend the Taylor Law to permit the negotiability of an agency fee for
state and local government employees in an amount "attributable to the
administration of representational rights."' 3 The report reasoned that an
agency shop would be an effective strike deterrent because it would be
revocable, like the dues 1deduction
checkoff, when a union engaged in pro4
hibited strike activities. 0
Later that year, New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay submitted a
report to the New York State Legislature setting forth New York City's
10 5
support for legislation to permit the negotiability of the agency shop.
In his report, Mayor Lindsay stated: "Harmonious labor relations requires
union security. We believe that the agency shop, a recognized form of
union security, will promote labor harmony and responsibility. The City
therefore supports legislation which will enable it to negotiate an agency
shop."'

10 6

PERB responded with comments to the State Legislature expressing
general concurrence with Mayor Lindsay's agency shop proposal. 10 7 In
its comments, however, PERB added that:
[I]t would be an error to enact special legislation permitting the negotiation of an agency shop for organizations
representing employees of New York City only. Authorization for negotiation of an agency shop should be
granted for all employee organizations which have been
recognized as the exclusive negotiating unit anywhere in

102.
Leonard Buder, Most City Schools Shut; Shanker Defying a Writ, Refuses to End Walkout,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1968, at 36.
103.
SELECT J. LEGIS. COMM. ON PUB. EMP. RELATIONS, 1969 REP at 74 (N.Y. 1969),
http://www.perb.ny.gov/wp-content/uploads/201 8/04/1969TLR.pdf.

104.

Id. at 26-27.

105.
Mayor John V. Lindsay, Report Designed to Bring New York City's Labor Relations Practice into Substantial Equivalence with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 3 (1969) (on file
with City of New York Department of Records & Information Services, Municipal Archives, John V.
Lindsay Files, Box 59, Folder 1097 Labor Policy-Relations, Taylor Law 1969).
106.
Id.at9-10.
107.
Robert D. Helsby et al., Comments of PERB Regarding the Employee Relations Report of
the Mayor of the City of New York at 9-10 (1969) (on file with City of New York Department of
Records & Information Services, Municipal Archives, John V. Lindsay Files, Box 59, Folder 1098
Labor Policy-Relations-Taylor Law).
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the state, or for none at all.10 8
Without enabling legislation, the City of New York committed to
enter into an agreement with an AFSCME local, representing 12,000 hos10 9
pital workers and requiring non-union members to pay an agency fee.
In announcing the agreement, Mayor Lindsay stated that he would support
proposed legislation to permit an agency fee for bargaining units subject
to the New York City Collective Bargaining Law ("NYCCBL"). 110 In
explaining his support for an agency shop, Lindsay stated "[b]ut if we are
to have peaceful progress in the field of labor relations, penalties [for striking] must be matched by affirmative steps, and approval of the concept of
the agency shop is clearly such an affirmative step."''
On May 29, 1969, the City of New York signed a written contract
with AFSCME, which represented a unit of municipal clerical employees,
that included a provision stating the "parties agree to an agency shop to
the extent permitted by applicable law, the provisions to be contained in
A supplemental agreement was reached
a supplemental agreement...,,
on August 3, 1969, that provided that all non-member employees in the
at-issue bargaining unit as a condition of employment shall pay a fee to
the union that is equal to monthly dues paid by union members." 13 However, New York City reneged on the supplemental agreement after the
Corporation Counsel refused to approve it on the grounds that it conflicted
with state law requiring a written authorization for the deduction of a
11
fee. 4
A 1972 New York Joint Legislative Committee study again examined amending the Taylor Law to permit the negotiability of an agency
shop provision." 5 The report found wide recognition among New York
108.

Id. at 10.

109. Seth S. King, Agency Shop Won By Municipal Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1969, at 1.
110. Id. at 19; see also New York City Collective Bargaining Law, 12 N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE §§
12-301 to 12-316 (N.Y. Legal Pub. Corp. 1995).
King, supranote 109 at 19.
111.
112. Zurlo v. Haber, Exhibit A Contract between City of New York and District Council 37,
AFSCME, Article XXIII (May 29, 1969) (on file with City of New York Department of Records &
Information Services, Municipal Archives, John V. Lindsay Files, Box 59, Folder 1094 Labor Policy
-Agency Shop 1968-1969).
113.
Zurlo v. Haber, Exhibit B Supplemental Agreement between City of New York and District
Council 37, AFSCME (Aug. 3, 1969) (on file with City of New York Department of Records &
Information Services, Municipal Archives, John V. Lindsay Files, Box 59, Folder 1094 Labor Policy
- Agency Shop 1968-1969).
114. Zurlo v. Haber, Exhibit C Letter from Herbert Haber to Victor Gotbaum (Aug. 20, 1969)
(on file with City of New York Department of Records & Information Services, Municipal Archives,
John V. Lindsay Files, Box 59, Folder 1094 Labor Policy - Agency Shop 1968-1969).
115.
THE J. LEGIS. COMM. ON THE TAYLOR L., PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
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employers and unions that an agency shop strengthens and stabilizes the
incumbent union.1 16 The Joint Legislative Committee stated that certain
"public employers are more or less willingly to go along with the agency
shop," while others opposed it. 117 Surprisingly, the report found a lack of
unanimity among unions concerning an agency shop."1 8 A minority believed that an agency shop "would remove the pressure on an organization
to press for goals with universal appeal to the employees in the unit," and
"in the long run the support of the organization by the membership may
decline or be less dependable and that such decline in support is likely to
mean that the employer has a less responsible organization with which to
negotiate." 9
In the same year of the legislative study, the New York City Collective Bargaining Law was amended to permit negotiations over the agency
1 20
shop between that municipality and the unions representing its workers.
Due to continuing legal uncertainties about the agency shop outside of
New York City, New York's two university systems, SUNY and CUNY,
negotiated reopener clauses in their faculty contracts in case the Taylor
21
Law was amended to permit an agency shop.1
The Taylor Law, however, was not amended to include the agency
shop until one month after the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Abood 22 upholding the constitutionality of a negotiated agency fee requirement for non-members. The agency shop fee bill was introduced in
the New York State Legislature on June 29, 1977, by New York Republican State Senator John E. Flynn. 123 The bill was supported by various
unions and the City of New York but opposed by other public employers. 124 The Taylor Law amendment mandated agency fee deductions to
public sector unions representing state employees, and made an agency
shop provision a mandatory subject of bargaining for all other public employees.125 In 1992, it was again amended to mandate the agency shop in

1971-72 REP., 25, at 36 (1972), http://www.perb.ny.gov/pdf/1971jlc.pdf.
116.
Id.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.

121.

RONALD

Id.
Id.
Id. at44.
L.

JOHNSTONE, THE

SCOPE OF FACULTY

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:

AN

ANALYSIS OF FACULTY UNION AGREEMENTS AT FOUR-YEAR INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION,

at 141 (1981).
122.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
123. Legislative Bill Jacket to 1977 N.Y. Ch. 677, at 1-2, 38-66 (N.Y. 1977) (available at the
New York State Archives, Box 64, Rolls 47-48).
124.
Id.
125.
1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws. Ch. 677 (McKinney).
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all public sector collective bargaining relationships.1 26 The agency shop
fee amendments in New York had the intended effect of improving public
sector labor relations as demonstrated by the decline of strikes and threatened strikes.
D. The Court'sDecisionsFindingAgency Fees to be Constitutional
The Supreme Court's initial consideration of the agency shop, eventually extended to the public sector in Abood, arose in the private sector
under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA").127 In Railway Employees Depart-

ment v. Hanson, the Court found constitutional an agency shop fee agreement entered into pursuant to the RLA against a First Amendment challenge brought by employees who did not wish to join the union. 128 In
rejecting the claim that such fees violated the First Amendment as well as
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, in a
unanimous opinion by Justice William 0. Douglas, held that:
On the present record, there is no more an infringement
or impairment of First Amendment rights than there
would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar. It is argued
that compulsory membership will be used to impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by
this record. Congress endeavored to safeguard against that
possibility by making explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as respects 'periodic dues,
initiation fees, and assessments.' If other conditions are
in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees,
or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological
conformity or other action in contravention of the First
Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision
in that case.... We only hold that the requirement for
financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by
all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not vi129
olate either the First or the Fifth Amendments.
Justice Douglas's authorship of this opinion, as well as Justice Hugo
126.
127.
128.
129.

1992 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 606 (McKinney).
SeeAbood,431 U.S. at217-18n.12.
Railway Emps.' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
Id. at 238.
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L. Black's silent concurrence in it, is salient, in that Douglas and Black
were the two self-described First Amendment absolutists in the Court's
history, and both consistently advocated for broader protection of freedom
1 30
of speech than their colleagues were willing to accept.
In InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, reaffirmed Hanson, but engaged in a "saving
construction" of the relevant section of the RLA, reading it "to deny the

unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds
to support political causes which he opposes.", 131 Accordingly, the Court
found that where employees have "made known to their respective unions
their objection to the use of their money for the support of political

causes," that "the respective unions were without power to use pay'1 32

ments thereafter tendered by them for such political causes."
The Court allowed either of two remedies.1 33 The first took the form

of an injunction, at the dissenters' request, ordering the reduction of the
union's political expenditures by the proportion of their agency fees that
would be otherwise be used for political purposes to which the dissenter
objected.134 Alternatively, a "second remedy would be restitution to each
individual employee of that portion of his money which the union expended, despite his notification, for the political causes to which he had
advised the union he was opposed.' 135 In sum, Street upheld Hanson to
find the agency shop constitutional, but glossed the statute to also require
the union, on request by the dissenters, to either not apply the portion of a
130. See generally JOHN F. WiRENius, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES: VERBAL ACTS
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2d ed. 2004) (working out implications for First Amendment jurisprudence ofDouglas's absolutist refusal to support censorship, allowing only regulation of"verbal acts");
Lee Dennison, Absolutism: Unadornedand Without Apology, 81 GEO. L.J. 351, 362 (1992) (stating
that "the members of the Supreme Court who have been the most 'liberal' in their understanding of
the First Amendment's liberating possibilities-Justices William Brennan, Hugo Black, and William
0. Douglas-have been understood to be 'absolutists,' despite the easily demonstrable fact that every
one of them put substantial qualifiers into his interpretation of the First Amendment," while only
giving an example regarding Brennan, who never claimed to be an absolutist); Justice Black's acceptance of a thin distinction between "speech" and "conduct" in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
18 (1971) tends to support Dennison in deeming him a non-absolutist, but was an outlier in Black's
jurisprudence. By contrast, when the majority essentially adopted Douglas's "verbal act" concept as
the only justification for regulation of speech that did not fall within one of the categorical exclusions
from the First Amendment, Douglas did not join the opinion, deeming it too narrow. Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450, 454-55 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
131.
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961).
132. Id. at 771.
133. Id. at 774.
134. Id. at 774-75.
135. Id. at 775. Interestingly, Douglas and Black split on this case, with Douglas concurring
"dubitante," as he wrote, because of his concerns with the remedy and Black dissenting entirely, on
the ground that the remedies were too narrow. Id. at779.
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dissenter's agency fee to political purposes, or to, upon request, refund it.
The rule in these cases was extended to public sector employees in
1977, in Abood.3 6 The Court in A bood reaffined the constitutional findings in Hanson and Street that an agency shop did not violate the First
Amendment, and, further, applied the same constitutional calculus to public sector employees, "insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment.' 137 In so doing, the Court
acknowledged that "[t]o be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in
some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement
of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit."' 38 However, it found
that "[t]he confusion and conflict that could arise if rival... unions, holding quite different views... each sought to obtain the employer's agreement, are no different in kind from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the
Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid."'139 The Court further found
that the "desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sec140
tor, nor is the risk of 'free riders' any smaller.'
The Court rejected claims that the private sector employment at issue
under the RLA was constitutionally different from public sector employees, and, significantly, expressly repudiated the notion that "in any event
collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently 'political' and thus
requires a different result under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."''
Likewise, the Court found that the First Amendment required the balance pitched by the Court on statutory grounds in Street: that members
who dissented from expenditures not directly related to collective bargaining or provision of services could not be charged for such expenses, upon
notification of their objection to their union. The Abood Court adopted a
remedy laid out in yet another case under the RLA: "(1) the refund of a
portion of the exacted funds in the proportion that union political expend-

136. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Notably, petitioner's attorney in
Abood was Sylvester Petro, an ardent libertarian opponent of public and private sector bargaining
laws, viewing them as leading to the impairment of individual rights. See Joseph A. McCartin, The
RadicalRoots of Janus, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Feb. 27, 2018), http://prospect.org/article/radical-roots-janus.
137. Abood, 431 U.S. at 225-26.
138. Id. at 222.
139. Id. at 224.
140. Id.

141.

Id. at 227, 229-30.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law,

21

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

itures bear to total union expenditures, and (2) the reduction of future exactions by the same proportion.' ' 142 In particular, the Court urged the creation of a voluntary refund process by the union, as the legal process was
ill-suited for remediating such disputes. 143
The constitutional minimum requirements of such procedures as applied to public sector unions was drawn into question in Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson.144 In Hudson, the Court found the fact that nonunion
employees' rights are protected by the First Amendment requires that the
union's procedures be carefully tailored to minimize an agency shop's infringement on those rights. 145 Additionally, the Court found, the nonunion
employee "must have a fair opportunity to identify the impact [on those
rights] and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim."' 146 The Court
struck down the specific procedure before it on three grounds: First, the
procedure failed to minimize the risk that nonunion employees' contributions might be used for impermissible purposes, and then subsequently
refunded, which it deemed inimical to the dissenter's rights.147 Second, it
failed to provide nonmembers with adequate "information about the basis
for the proportionate share" from which the advance deduction of dues
was calculated. 148 Finally, the Court found that the procedure "failed to
provide for a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker.' ' 14 9 The Court concluded that "[tihe nonunion employee,
whose First Amendment rights are affected by the agency shop itself and
who bears the burden of objecting, is entitled to have his objections ad'' 5
dressed in an expeditious, fair, and objective manner. 1 0
Finally, in terms of what expenses are chargeable, the Court provided
some limited guidance. In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, the
Court held that "a local bargaining representative may charge objecting
employees for their pro rata share of the costs associated with otherwise
chargeable activities of its state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees'

142.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 240 (citing Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963)).
143.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 240.
144.
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 (1986). The Hudson Court leaned
heavily on yet another decision under the RLA, Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
145.
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303.
146.
Id.

147.
148.

Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 306.

149.
150.

Id. at 307.
Id.
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bargaining unit.' 51 The Lehnert Court conditioned this finding on a requirement that there be "some indication that the payment is for services
that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union
by virtue of their membership in the parent organization." 152 Notably, in
his concurrence in Lehnert, Justice Scalia addressed the free-rider problem, finding that it raised a "compelling state interest"; as he phrased it:
Where the state imposes upon the union a duty to deliver
services, it may permit the union to demand reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the other end, where the
from
state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement
53
cost.
the
pay
to
them
compel
may
it
the union,
In Locke v. Karass,154 the Court resolved the issue on which the
Lehnert Court splintered, and thus left undecided-whether that payment
of expenses for national litigation was properly chargeable. The Locke
Court determined that:

-

[C]onsistent with the Court's precedent, costs of that litigation are chargeable provided the litigation meets the
relevant standards for charging other national expenditures that the Lehnert majority enunciated. Under those
standards, a local union may charge a nonmember an appropriate share of its contribution to a national's litigation
expenses if (1) the subject matter of the national litigation
bears an appropriate relation to collective bargaining and
(2) the arrangement is reciprocal-that is, the local's payment to the national affiliate is for "services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local
union by virtue of their membership in the parent organi15 5
zation.,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined in the concurring
opinion of Justice Alito, who agreed with the Court's opinion on the merits, but "note[d] that our decision, as I understand it, does not reach the

151.

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991).

152.

Id.

153.
154.
155.

Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 208 (2009).
Id. at 217-18.
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question of what 'reciprocity' means," as both parties had assumed reciprocity had been established. 156 The concurrence suggested that in a case
where the issue was disputed, the First Amendment might require "a national union [to] bear the burden of proving that any expenditures charged
to nonmembers of a local are made pursuant to a bona fide pooling arrangement."1 57 Neither the majority or concurrence questioned the holding in Abood Thus, as recently as 2009, a unanimous Court, far from
seeking to undermine the Abood rule, expanded the scope of what expenses are chargeable to nonmember dissentients under it.
E. Intimations of Mortality: The Erosion of Precedent
After over three decades, the stability of the basic regime of Abood
seemed established; while there was room for tinkering about at the
edges-what expenses would be deemed chargeable, what procedures
would be deemed adequate-the basic parameters seemed to be settled
law. Indeed, the Roberts Court's 2009 resolution of the chargeability of
national litigation, upon a proper showing of reciprocity, evinced a greater
consensus in applying Abood than had existed in 1991, where the Court
fragmented in Lehnert. The appearance of consensus and stability, however, was quickly shattered.
In 2012, the Court decided Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, in which it
found that a union's "special assessment" to create a fund for "a broad
range of political expenses, including television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education, and get out the vote activities
in our work sites and in our communities across California" did not comply with the procedural requirements of Hudson.1 58 This ruling, it is fair
to say, was relatively uncontroversial; the procedure required nonmembers to pay the same portion of the special assessment, expressly dedicated
to political purposes, as of annual dues, and did not provide a fresh Hudson notice stating how any portion of the special assessment was chargeable. 159 The Court went further, stating that the union was obliged to
couch that fresh Hudson notice as requiring the nonmember to affinnatively agree to pay the assessment-that is, to "opt in"to the assessmentrather than, as in the context of annual dues, to "opt out" of nonchargeable
expenses. 160 The Court stated that "there is no way to justify the addi-

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.at 221 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.at 222.
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 100, 567 U.S. 298, 304, 322 (2012).
Id.at 318.
Id.at 317.
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tional burden of imposing yet another opt-out requirement to collect spe'1 61
cial fees whenever the union desires."
Beyond the new "opt-in" requirement of Knox, the Court's opinion,
written by Justice Alito, included several pieces of dicta designed to undermine Abood and its progeny, and implicitly invite First Amendment
challenges to the agency shop.' 62 Thus, the Court wrote that "the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled speech and association that imposes a significant impingement on First Amendment rights," adding that
"[o]ur cases to date have tolerated this 'impingement,' and we do not readequate recogvisit today whether the Court's former cases have given
163
nition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake."'
The Knox Court further undermined Aboodby quoting an earlier case
to the effect that "[t]he primary purpose of permitting unions to collect
fees from nonmembers is to prevent nonmembers from free-riding on the
union's efforts, sharing the employment benefits obtained by the union's
collective bargaining without sharing the costs incurred.' ' 164 The Court
then pivoted, flatly declaring without attribution that "[s]uch free-rider arguments, however, are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections."' 165 The Court found that the acceptance of the free-rider
we have found to
interest "represents something of an anomaly---one that
'1 66
peace."
labor
furthering
in
interest
the
be justified by
Finally, the Court stated that "requiring objecting nonmembers to opt
out of paying the nonchargeable portion of union dues-as opposed to
exempting them from making such payments unless they opt in-represents a remarkable boon for unions."' 16 7 The Court suggested that "acceptance of the opt-out approach appears to have come about more as a
historical accident 8than through the careful application of First Amend16
ment principles."'
The Court included further dicta undermining Abood in Harris v.
Quinn, which held unconstitutional an agency fee statute applicable to

161.
162.
163.
164.

-

Id.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 310-11 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S., 435, 455 (1984)).
Id. at 311 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007)) (holding

constitutional a state's requirement that a union obtain a nonmember's consent to use nonmember
agency fees for non-chargeable purposes).
165.
Id.
166.
Id. (quoting Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986)) ("[T]he government interest in labor peace is strong enough to support an 'agency shop"').
Id. at312.
167.
168. Id.
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non-member Medicaid-funded home care personal assistants, which it described as "quasi-public employees," who were predominantly employed,
the Court found, by the home care recipients, and not the State. 169 The
Court's opinion contained a detailed critique of Hanson, Street, and
Abood,7 ° which, at seven pages, was only slightly shorter than the entire
discussion of the merits of the case before the Court. In the subsequent
ten pages, the Court distinguished Abood, which it found limited "to fullfledged public employees," 171 found inapplicable to the "quasi-public employees" at issue the balancing test applied to public employees' free
speech claims under Pickering v. Board of Education,172 and found that
the application of that framework would not support agency fees in any
event. As the Court in Harris summarized the rule of Pickering and its
progeny:
[E]mployee speech is unprotected if it is not on a matter
of public concern (or is pursuant to an employee's job duties), but speech on matters of public concern may be restricted only if "the interest of the state, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees outweighs the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
173
public concern."'
The Court then rejected the notion that "union speech that is germane
to collective bargaining does not address matters of public concern and,
as a result, is not protected."' 174 The Court, finding such speech to be a
matter of public concern, due to the increased public expenditure entailed
75
in increased employee wages, then moves on to the balancing test.'
However, in applying the balancing test, it first found that the interest in
labor peace was vitiated in the facts before it, because the "State is not
like the closed-fisted employer that is bent on minimizing employee
wages and benefits and that yields only grudgingly under intense union
169.
170.
171.

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
Id. at 2627-34.
Id at 2638. Interestingly, the Court did not address whether the State's role in the creation
of the employment relationship, like the RLA's provision for the agreements at issue in Hanson and
Street, had any bearing on the constitutionality of agency fee as applied to the home care personal
assistants at issue in Harris.Id.
172.
Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
173. Harris, 573 at 2642 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, at 568).
174. Id.
175.
See id. at 2653-54.
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pressure."'' 7 6 By contrast, the Court found, "[a]gency-fee provisions un-

questionably impose a heavy burden on the First Amendment interests of
objecting employees.' ' 177 Under such circumstances, based on its discounting of the role played by the union, and the Court's prior dismissal
of the "free rider" problem, the Court declined to find that the Pickering
balance could, even if applied, tilt in favor of agency fees as applied to
78
these employees.1

Unsurprisingly, the Court's less than subtle invitations for a case to
overrule Abood led to the filing of Friedrichsv. California Teachers Association, a constitutional challenge to California's agency fee statute. 179
After the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the Ninth Circuit's decision following Abood was "affirmed by an equally divided Court."'18 o The successor challenge, Janus v. AFSCME, was decided at the end of the October 2017 Term.

II. JANUS V. AFSCME
A. The Opinion
Mark Janus was, prior to his recent retirement, a child care specialist
with the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services.18 1 He
didn't join the union, but was required to pay an agency fee. 182 Illinois'
Governor sued challenging the constitutionality of agency fees.' 8 3 Janus

176. Id. at 2641.
177. Id. at 2643.
178. See id at 2641-42.
179. See Friedrichs v. Cali. Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
180. Id.
181.
See Mitchell Armentrout, Mark Janus Quits State Job for Conservative Think Tank Gig
AfterLandmark Ruling, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (July 20,2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/anus-afscme-illinois-policy- institute-job-ruling-fair-share-union-dues/ (supporting his litigation upon
his retirement, Janus was hired by the Illinois Policy Institute); see Noam Scheiber and Kenneth P.
Vogel, Behind a Key Anti-Labor Case, a Web of Conservative Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/20 18/02/25/business/economy/labor-court-conservatives.html (pertaining
to background information concerning the Illinois Policy Institute); see DAN KAUFMAN, THE FALL
OF WISCONSIN: THE CONSERVATIVE CONQUEST OF A PROGRESSIVE BASTON AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 121 (discussing the Illinois Policy Institute as an affiliate of the American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC"), which along with the State Policy Network has been responsible for drafting model state "right to work" laws and similar legislation); JANE MAYER, DARK
MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 346
(2016).
182. ILL. COMP. STAT. 5, 315/6 (2016).
183. Brief for the City of New York as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16-17,
Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law,

27

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

intervened.18 4 The Governor's challenge was dismissed for lack of stand185
ing, but Janus and two other state employees filed the instant case.
The Janus Court, in a 5-4 decision, overturned Abood as violative of
the First Amendment and eliminated agency fees for public sector employees in the United States.1 86 The opinion was written by Justice Alito
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and
Gorsuch. 187 As a matter of history, the opinion partially effectuates the
early 2 0 th Century goal of the National Association
of Manufacturers to
1 88
make the open shop a constitutional mandate.
The Court found that compelling a person to subsidize the free
speech of private actors raises substantial First Amendment concerns that
require more than rational basis scrutiny.1 89 However, the Court left for
1 90
another day whether exacting or strict scrutiny applies in this context.
Instead, the majority found that under the purportedly lesser "exacting
scrutiny" applied in Knox and Harris,the agency shop in the public sector
is unconstitutional. 19 1
Assuming that labor peace is a compelling state interest, the Court
found that it can be achieved with less restrictive means than agency fees
given the examples of other states and the federal government, whose unions do not have agency fees and still enjoy labor peace. 192 The Court's
decision did not address the inherent differences between federal, state,
and local governments, each of whom have distinct labor histories, experiences, and needs. In particular, the Court avoided referencing the extensive collective bargaining history described in the City of New York's
amicus brief, which explained how the implementation of the agency shop
in New York led to a dramatic decrease in public worker strikes.1 93
The Court also found that "avoiding free riders is not a compelling
interest."'1 94 In doing so, the majority determined that unions will still
represent nonmembers. 195 Even though the Court conceded that requiring
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
No. 578,

Armentrout, supra note 181.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2462.
Id.at 2460.
Id.
See Henry White, The Issue of the Open and ClosedShop, THE NORTH AM. REV. Vol. 180,
Jan. 1905, at 30 (quoting from the Pittsburgh convention of the National Association of

Manufacturers).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
Id.
Id. at 2486.
Id. at 2466.
Brief, supra note 183 at 15-16.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466.

195.

Id. at 2468.
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the representation of employees who do not pay any fees to the union is
an added burden, the Court found that the special privileges conferred to
the union-including being the exclusive representative, obtaining information about employees, and dues deductions-"greatly outweigh any
extra burden imposed by the duty of providing fair representation for non'
members." 196
Next, the Court addressed the new originalist argument that Abood
was correctly decided because "the First Amendment was not originally
understood to provide any protection for the free speech rights of public
employees."' 97 The Court seemed taken aback by this argument, asserting
that the respondents probably did not actually mean that employees did
not have free speech rights, only that it did not prohibit agency fees.198 In
any case, the Court opined that the concept of agency fees was nonetheless
not supported by originalist logic, as the Founding Fathers abhorred and
1 99
condemned compulsory speech laws.'
The Court found that the Pickering test was inapplicable to agency
fees, reasoning that Abood was not based on Pickering and the Court
"see[s] no good reason, at this late date, to try to shoehorn Abood into the
Pickering framework. ' '200 Regardless, the Court found that the Pickering
framework does not work in this context for three reasons. First, the Court
found of constitutional relevance the fact that Pickeringwas based on one
employee's speech. 20 1 The Court acknowledged that "we have sometimes
looked to Pickeringin considering general rules that affect broad categories of employees," but asserted that the more employees involved-as in
the case when the union is bargaining for an entire unit-the more the
category of speech at issue is a matter of public concern and the government is entitled to less deference.20 2
Second, the Pickering test does not work where the government is
compelling an employee to subsidize third party speech. 3 Finally, the
Court found that the Pickeringtest could not be applied because it would
change the Abood scheme.20 4
Despite its determination that Pickering is inapplicable, the Court
nonetheless went on to examine the constitutionality of agency fees under
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.at 2467-68.
Id.at 2469.
Id.
Id. at 2471.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2472.

201.

Id.at 2472-73.

202.
203.
204.

Id. at 2472.
Id.at 2472.
Id.at 2473.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law,

29

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

a modified version of the Pickeringtest, finding that even there agency
fees could not survive.2 °5 In applying the first step of that analysis, the
Court declared that union speech is not the speech of employees pursuant
to official duties and therefore the Court's decision in Garcettiv. Ceballos
is inapplicable. °6 The majority opinion did not analyze the fact that Pickering and its progeny, such as Garcetti,are based on a distinction between
the government as employer and the government as sovereign, or the concomitant rule that "the government as employer indeed has far broader
powers than does the government as sovereign., 20 7 In collective bargaining, of course, the employer acts as employer, not sovereign.
Under the second step, the Court concluded that union speech in collective bargaining "is overwhelmingly of substantial public concern,"
predicated on its dicta in Harris that "it is impossible to argue that the
level of [state spending for employee benefits] is not a matter of great
public concern., 20 8 Finally, the Court found that the State's proffered reasons for agency fees-labor peace, avoiding free riders, and bargaining
with an adequately funded exclusive representative-are insufficient to
overcome the burden placed on nonmembers' First Amendment interests
through agency fees. 20 9 Significantly, the substantial deference given
public sector employers under Pickeringand its progeny concerning the
potential for workplace disruptions resulting from an individual employee's speech was not applied in Janus concerning employer predictions of disruptions caused by the elimination of the agency fee.210
Although the Court generally follows its own precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court found that the application of stare decisis was not warranted in this case. 21 As an initial matter, the Court
stated that "stare decisis applies with perhaps least force of all to decisions
that wrongly denied First Amendment rights. 21 2 The Court then found
that five factors were important in this case.2 13 First, the Court found that
205.
206.
(2006).

Id. at 2474.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2473-74, citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22, 425-26

207.
See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept of Ag., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (quoting Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983) (quoting Ex
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882) (alterations in original) (explaining that the government has a
legitimate interest "in 'promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and [in]
maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service"').
208. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474, 2477.

209.

Id. at 2478.

210.
211.
212.

Id. at 2469-74.
Id. at 2472-73, 2478.
Id. at 2478.

213.

Id. at 2478-79.
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the quality of Abood's rationale was poor and therefore weighed in favor
of overruling it. 214 Second, the Court in Janus reached a factual conclusion that Abood was "unworkable" despite the lack of a factual record. 15
Specifically, the Court found that "Abood's line between chargeable and
nonchargeable union expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw
with precision., 216 The Court also found that employees wishing to chal2 17
lenge the expenses charged by a union face an uphill battle to do so.
Third, the increased public spending "and the political debate over public
spending and debt they have spurred, have given collective-bargaining issues a political valence that Abood did not fully appreciate." 218 Fourth,
the Court described Abood as an anomaly in First Amendment jurisprudence, as noted in Harris and Knox. 219 Fifth, "the uncertain status of
Abood,... the short-term nature of collective-bargaining agreements, and
the ability of unions to protect themselves if an agency-fee provision was
crucial to its bargaining all220work to undermine the force of reliance as a
factor supporting Abood.,

Finally, the Court found that statutes like Illinois', which provide automatic deductions of agency fees if a collective bargaining agreement
includes an agency-fee provision, are unconstitutional. 221 These payments cannot be collected unless the employee affirmatively consents to
such payment.2 22 Unmentioned in the Court's majority decision are the
democratic procedures available to dissenting bargaining unit members,
including agency fee payers, to reject or change representatives, as it did
with respect to procedures available to dissenting shareholders in the context of corporate political speech.2 23
Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor. 224 First, Justice Kagan disagreed with the majority's statement that Abood was wrongly decided, and referenced the Court's "6-year
campaign to reverse Abood., 225 She found that there is a governmental
interest in stable labor relations, and that agency fees can be determined

214.
215.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479-81.
Id. at2482.

216.

Id.

217.

Id. at2481-82.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 2483.
Id. at 2485.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485.
Id. at 2486.
Id.
See Citizens United. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010).
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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by public employers to be necessary to achieve labor relations as stable
funding is needed for unions to be effective representatives.2 26 She went
on to note that the majority was wrong to not apply the normal deferential
standard to speech restricted by an employer.22 7 The dissent also asserted
that the majority opinion "subverts all known principles of stare decisis.''228 Specifically, the majority does not provide the special justification demanded "over and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly
decided.,229 Justice Kagan ends her dissent warning of the majority's
"weaponization" of the First Amendment:
There is no sugarcoating today's opinion. The majority
overthrows a decision entrenched in this Nation's lawand in its economic life-for over 40 years. As a result,
it prevents the American people, acting through their state
and local officials, from making important choices about
workplace governance. And it does so by weaponizing
the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now
and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory
policy... Speech is everywhere-a part of every human
activity (employment, health care, securities trading, you
name it). For that reason, almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech. So the majority's
road runs long. And at every stop are black-robed rulers
overriding citizens' choices. The First Amendment was
meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine
but to protect democratic governance-including over the
role of public-sector unions.23 °
Justice Sotomayor also separately dissented, finding that while she
had joined the majority in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552
(2011), she was troubled by the way the case has "allowed the courts to
wield the First Amendment in an aggressive way just as the majority does
today.231

226.

Id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

227. Id. at 2493-94 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
228.
Id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
230. Id.at 2501-02 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
231.
Id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J.,dissenting).
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B. Janus'Scope
Despite the extensive news coverage foreshadowing the potential demise of public sector bargaining, Janus constitutes a return to the general
legal regime that had existed prior to Abood.232 Prior to that decision,
there was a massive growth in public sector unionization and collective
bargaining throughout the country despite the lack of the agency shop under many states and local collective bargaining laws. During the same
period, there was also a substantial number of public sector strikes that
dissipated following the introduction of the agency shop.23 3 While federal
employees are not, and have never been, required to pay agency fees, one
of the most significant strikes in public sector history took place in 1981
among federal air traffic controllers.23 4 Finally, not all state and local employees have a statutory right to bargain collectively, and only some of
235
their unions could bargain agency fees prior to Janus.
The difficulty of determining which state and local employees can
bargain varies by jurisdiction.2 36 Some states, such as Virginia, prohibit
public sector bargaining. 7 Other states, such as New York, Massachusetts, and Washington, have comprehensive labor laws.23 8 The remaining
states either explicitly allow or do not prohibit collective bargaining for
some (but not all) state and local employees.2 39 In these states, one must
piece together varying laws--or a lack thereof-to determine the bargaining rights or restrictions of different employee groups, such as state employees, municipal employees, teachers, firefighters, and police.
Indiana is an example of a state with differences in bargaining rights
for different groups of employees. 240 For state employees, the right to

232. See supra Part I.
233. Brief for Respondents at 1, Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., and Municipal Emps.,
Council 31, et al., (2018) No. 16-1466; see also JANET MCENEANEY & ROBERT P. HEBDON,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES 185 fig. 7.2
(Joyce M. Najita et al. eds., 2001).
234. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 17, 1962); see also Janus, 585 U.S.
at 12; JOSEPH A. MACCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2011).
235. See Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-SectorLabor in the Post Thirty
Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511, 514 (2013); see also Hopfl, supra note 38, at 479-82.
236.
Slater, supra note 235, at511-12; see MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON.
AND POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES
3 (2014).
237. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (West 2018).
238. See SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 236, at 37, 48, 63.
239. JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER No. 408, ELIMINATING FAIR
SHARE FEES AND MAKING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT "RIGHT-TO-WORK" WOULD INCREASE THE PAY
PENALTY FOR WORKING IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 8, 14 n.3 (2015).
240. KEEFE, supra note 239, at14 n.3.
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bargain was granted and removed by executive order and is now prohibited by law.24' Public safety employees (police and fire) only have the
statutory right to meet and confer, under which the employer is required
to meet with the exclusive representative, but is not obligated to enter into
a collective bargaining agreement.24 2 For the majority of the remaining
local employees, there are no statutes requiring, allowing, or prohibiting
bargaining.24 3
The most robust public sector bargaining in Indiana arguably involves K-12 teachers. 244 Most public K-12 teachers have the right to bargain salary, wages, and fringe benefits.2 45 Teachers also have a right similar to meet and confer called discussion, which requires the
superintendent to discuss certain enumerated items (e.g., school curriculum, student discipline, etc.) with the teachers' union prior to implementation. 4 6 There are wrinkles within this framework. Some teachers, such
as charter school teachers, have not sought to be represented by a union,
despite their ability to do so. 2 4 7 Other teachers-primarily in academically or financially troubled schools-have limited bargaining rights, such
as a limited scope of bargaining or the ability to bargain only if the employer consents. 248
Prior to Janus, whether agency fees were allowed varied by and
within states. 49 While some states explicitly allowed or mandated agency
fees, others prohibited them, and still others had no relevant statute.250

241. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-17-5 (West 2018); Ind. Exec. Order 05-14,28 Ind. Reg. 1904 (Mar.
1, 2005); Ind. Exec. Order 03-35, 27 Ind. Reg. 1007 (Dec. 1, 2003); Ind. Exec. Order No. 97-8, 20
Ind. Reg. 2222 (May 1, 1997); Ind. Exec. Order No. 90-6, 13 Ind. Reg. 1925 (July 1, 1990).
242. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-8-22-2, 22-8, 22-12 (West 2018).
243. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-9-4-37 (West 2018) (stating that there are bargaining rights for public
transportation corporation employees).
244. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-29-6-4(a), 6-7(11) (2018).
245. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-29-6-4(a) (1)-(4) (West 2018).
246. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-29-6-7 (West 2018).
247. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-6-3(a) (West 2018). For a list of teacher collective bargaining
units in Indiana, see INDIANA GATEWAY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACT UPLOADS REPORT:
2018
REPORT,
https://gateway.ifionline.org/report builder/Default3a.aspx?rpttype=collBargain&rpt=contract uploads&rptName=Collective%20Bargaining%2OContract%2OUploads.
248. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-23-18-3, -31-9.5-9.5(d) (West 2018) (stating that certain
schools are not subject to bargaining unless there is voluntary recognition and the employer may
authorize a school to opt out of bargaining allowable subjects or discussing discussion items); IND.
CODE ANN. § 20-25.7-6-6 (West 2018) ("Employees who participate in the pilot program under this
chapter are members of the bargaining unit of the innovation network school [if any]. However, salary
increases may not be collectively bargained for employees who participate.., but shall be determined
according to the plan approved under section 5 of this chapter [of the code].").
249. KEEFE, supra note 239, at 2.
250. See id. at 2, 15, n.3.
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Again, Indiana provides a representative example. 25' Agency fees were
explicitly prohibited for Indiana teachers:
(a) A school employee 25 2 may not be required to join or financially
support through the payment of: (1) fair share fees; (2) representation fees; (3) professional fees; or (4) other fees; a school employee organization.253
(b) A rule, regulation, or contract provision requiring financial support from a school employee to a school employee organization
2 54
is void.
Agency fees were also prohibited for Indiana state employees (in addition to bargaining) and public safety workers. 25 5 There is no statute regarding the few municipal and non-teacher school employees who bargain; there are some employees that have had agency fees in their contract ;
in the past, although it is unclear how many-if any-had agency fees at
the time of Janus.256
Although there are exceptions and variations within individual states,
generally the states that prohibit agency fees in the private sector also did
so in the public sector. 7
C. DirectEffects of Janus
The direct impact of Janus is already upon unions and employers
with agency fee provisions. Effectively, any contract, contractual provision, or state law providing for agency fees in the public sector has been
rendered void and unenforceable.2 58 Many contracts contain a severability or savings clause that would serve to save the validity of the contract
absent the void agency fee provision. 259 Even for those contracts without
such clauses, most jurisdictions "employ a presumption of severability to
251.
252.
employee
Education
253.

Id. at 14.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-29-2-4, 29-2-13 (West 2018) (stating that a school employee is an
whose employment with the school requires a permit or license from the Department of
and does not include all employees of the school corporation).
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-4-2 (West 2018).

254.

Id.

255.
256.

IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-8-22-8, 4-15-17-5 (West 2018).
Olivia Covington, Labor Laws Revisited: Unions Regroup after SCOTUS Ruling, THE

INDIANA LAWYER (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/47928-labor-laws-revisited-unions-regroup-after-scotus-ruling?platform=hootsuite (quoting labor attorney Jon Mayes
who stated that he "is not aware of any Indiana municipality that compels agency fees").
257.

KEEFE, supra note 239, at 2.

258.
259.

Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1993).
Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2485.
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Therefore, generally

"if one provision of a collective-bargaining agreement is found to be unlawful, the remaining provisions are likely to remain in effect., 261 Nevertheless, whether particular contracts are now unenforceable will depend
on state contract law. 262 It is possible, as noted in Justice Kagan's dissent,
that "some agency-fee provisions, if canceled, could bring down entire
contracts because they lack severability clauses. 263
The Supreme Court also found that no payments to the union "may
be deducted from a nonmember's wages, nor may any other attempt be
made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. '264 Therefore, any current statute, ordinance, or contract that
allows or requires the employer to automatically deduct union dues without affirmative consent might be also void and unenforceable.2 65 Such
266
deductions were allowed in several states, including Illinois.
Although many collective bargaining agreements were affected, the
substantive impact of Januswill rest on whether employees decide not to
voluntarily pay an agency fee or become dues paying union members.2 67
The number of employees who will decide not to join or to drop their
membership is difficult to predict, although it will likely vary by bargaining unit composition, geography, and local labor history. 268 The impact
of Janus on union membership will likely depend on the scope and quality
of internal union organizing, and the success or failure of outside forces
attempting to persuade employees to drop their membership.2 69
260. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485; C. Vered Jona, Cleaning Up for Congress: Why Courts
Should Reject the Presumption of Severability in the Face of UnconstitutionalLegislation, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 698, 699 (April 2008).
261.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485.
262.
16A Am. Juris. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 205 (May 2018) (establishing the effect of the
severability clause and citing to the various case decisions arising out of different states).
263. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499, n. 5 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see generally Board of County

Com'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
264. Id. at 2486.
265. Id.
266. Id; see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2013).
267. See Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, How States Are Making it Harderto Leave Unions, GOVERNING.COM (July 16, 2018), https://www.goveming.com/topics/workforce/gov-janus-protection-unions-states.html.
268.
See generally BARRY EIDLIN, LABOR AND THE CLASS IDEA IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA, 10, 55-57, 61 (2018) (analyzing data concerning the relationship between "right to work"
legal regimes and union density).
269. See Erica L. Green, Teachers Unions Scramble to Save Themselves After Supreme Court's

Blow, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/201 8/07/14/us/politics/teachers-unionssupreme-court.html; Ed Pilkingon, Exclusive: How Rightwing Groups Wield Secret 'Toolkit' to Plot
Against US Unions, THE GUARDIAN (May 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/may/15/rightwing-thinktanks-secret-plot-against-unions.
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Early data show that although most fee payers have stopped paying
fees and did not join the union, union membership did not decline precipitously, and in some cases went up. 2 7 0 Specifically, while AFSCME and
SE1U saw a 98% and 94% drop, respectively, in fee payers, they both

reported small changes in membership. Overall state and local union
membership declined in 2018, but only slightly. 271 However, depending
on the time of membership drives, this data likely does not give an accurate picture of the Janus impact-it is likely that there will still be some
additional drops.
Information from states that previously prohibited agency fees sheds
relevant light on the potential of Janus' aftermath. The decline of dues
and membership after the loss of agency fees in Wisconsin and Michigan

resulted in fluctuating drops.272 In Indiana, over twenty years after the
end of agency fees, teacher union membership varies by school district
from 12%-l00%.273 Despite the disparate membership rates, however,
most (over 60%) of Indiana teachers are members of their union.274

270. See Katherine Barrett and Richard Greene, Defying Predictions, Union Membership Isn 't
Dropping Post-Janus, Governing.com (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-janus-impact-union-membership.html; Robert lafolla, Mass Exodus of Public Union Fee
Payers After High Court Ruling, Bloomberglaw.com (Apr. 5, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/mass-exodus-of-public-union-fee-payers-after-high-court-ruling.
271. See Table 3 Union Affiliation of employed wage and salary workers by occupation and
industry 2018, Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm; see also
rina Ivanova, Union membership in the U.S. hit record low in 2018, CBS News (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/union-membership-declined-in-2018/.
272. See RUTH MILKMAN & STEPHANIE LUCE, THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 2017: A PROFILE OF
ORGANIZED LABOR IN NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK STATE, AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 5 (The Jo-

seph S. Murphy Inst. for Worker Educ. and Labor Studies ed. 2017); see also Jason Hart, State, Local
Laws Force Public Employees to Pay Labor Unions, WATCHDOG.ORG (Sept. 24, 2014),
https://www.watchdog.org/kentucky/state-local-laws-force-public-employees-to-pay-labor-un[https://www.sayanythingblog.com/enions/article 502aecfl- 141 a-58f2-b83c-6ee2d94599f4.html
try/state-local-laws-force-public-employees-to-pay-labor-unions/].
273.

INDIANA GATEWAY, EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (ERO) UPLOAD

REPORT: 2018 REPORT, https://gateway.ifionline.org/report builder/Default3a.aspxrpttype=collBargain&rpt-ero uploadspublic&rptName=ERO%2Upload%20Report, (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
274. Id.
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Beyond simple membership numbers, the authors could not find any
unit in Indiana that has ever voted to decertify an exclusive representative

without replacing it. 275 In the most recent teacher election, only 2 of 955
possible votes were for no representation.27 6

In addition to the loss of income from fee payers and likely some
former union members, some unions are also contending with lawsuits.277
Lawsuits have been filed in several states, including Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Washington, in which employees are requesting refunds of agency fees. 2 7 8 Typically, such lawsuits
would be unsuccessful given the long-standing dictum that, as Justice

Scalia phrased it, "reliance upon a square, unabandoned holding of the

275.
See IEERB SEARCH, https://ieerbsearch.ieerb.in.gov/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 18,
2019).
276. Final Order Certifying Exclusive Representative, Carmel Clay Schools Carmel Clay
Schools, R-16-04-3060 (IEERB H.O. 2017).
277.
Robert lafolla, Supreme Court Revives Lawsuit Seeking Union Agency Fee Refunds,
REUTERS (June 28, 2018, 8:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-employment-unions/supreme-court-revives-lawsuit-seeking-union-agency-fee-refunds-idUSL 1Ni TVOOP.
278.
Complaint, Pellegrino v. New York State United Teachers, No. 2:18-cv-C3439-JMA-GR8
(E.D.N.Y June 13, 2018); lafolla, supra note 277.
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Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance." 27 9 And "[a]t the time the
fair share fees were deducted and paid they were lawful under four decades of Supreme Court authority. ' 280 The Janus majority does mention
these payments, lamenting about how much money has "been taken from
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the
First Amendment," and finding that this "cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely., 281 Indeed, the first courts to have heard these cases have dismissed them on the basis of good faith reliance on Supreme Court precedent, including a suit filed by Janus.282
However, the final outcome of these suits is not so clear. The Janus
majority's rebuke of the reliance interest in analyzing the issue of stare
decisis hinges on the fact that after Friedrichswas issued on March 29,
2016, "any public sector union seeking an agency-fee provision in a collective bargaining agreement must have understood that the constitutionality of such a provision was uncertain. 2 83 And the United States Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in one such case, Riffey
v. Rauner,2 84 and sent it back to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for
2 85
In Riffey, the Seventh Circuit had
reconsideration in light of Janus.
affirmed the denial of class certification of home health care assistants on
the grounds that a highly individualized inquiry on the support of the union and injury occurred.286 Additionally, some of the class actions consist
of employees who claim that they only joined the union because they
would have had to pay agency fees regardless. 287 However, in requiring
employers to receive affirmative consent to deduct dues from employees'

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota By & Through Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 319, 321 (1992)
279.
(Scalia, J., concurring) overruledother grounds by S. Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 209899 (2018); but see Rodriguez de Quijoas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
280.
lafolla, supranote 277 (statement of Martin Malin).
281. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
F.Supp.3d
, 2019 WL 1323622 (N.D. Ohio
282. See, e.g., Lee v. Ohio Educ. Assoc.,
Mar. 29, 2019); Janus v. AFSCME, 2019 WL 1239780, (N.D. Ill., Mar. 18, 2019); Crockett v. NEAAlaska, _
F.Supp.3d., 2019 WL 1212082 (D. Alaska Mar. 14, 2019), Carey v. Inslee,
,2019 WL 1115259 (W.D. Wa. Mar. 11,2019).
F.Supp.3d
283. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2485. Certainly, any argument regarding unjust enrichment could not
be made prior to Locke, where the Court unanimously expanded the scope of chargeable agency fees.
See Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 210 (2008). Moreover, the statute of limitations applicable to
personal injury actions in the state in which an action is venued would apply. Owens v. Okure, 488

U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In New York State, for example, that statute is three years. Pearl v. City of
Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002); Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp.3d 578, 60001 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
284. Riffey v. Rauner, 873 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2017) vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).
285. Riffey v. Rauner, 138 S.Ct 2708 (2018).
286. Riffey, 873 F.3d at 566.
287. Id. at 561-62.
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wages, the Court also implies that once the employee provides consent,
they have waived their First Amendment rights in this regard.288
An important consequential effect of Janus is the reenergizing that
is taking place among public employees and their unions, including an
increase in strikes.2 89
The need for organizational and strategic change by public employee
unions is nothing new, and Janus has become a catalyst for that change.
Efforts toward adopting the "organizing model" date back to the late
1980,s.290 Those efforts included proposals for massive changes in union
priorities and membership mobilization.2 91 Two decades ago, an AFLCIO official declared that it was then "focused on building membership
strength through organizing-and on transforming unions at every level
into institutions with the will, the skill, and the resources to organize ef2 92
fectively.

Frequently omitted from discussions about the agency shop is the
numbing effect it had on internal organizing efforts. It must be recalled
that in 1972 some New York unions expressed concerns to the State Legislature about the adverse effect the agency shop had on union goals and
the scope of union membership. 93 While agency fees became an important part of the financial underpinning of the exclusive representation
model, it was also a material disincentive for unions to invest time and

288. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2486 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.130, 145 (1967)).
289. See, e.g., Alia Wong, America's Teachers Are Furious: From West Virginia to Los Angeles, educators are ushering in a new era of labor activism, The Atlantic (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/01/teachers-are-launching-a-rebellion/580975/;
Noam Scheiber, Labor Unions Will be Smaller After Supreme Court Decision, But Maybe Not
Weaker, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/economy/supreme-court-unions-future.html; see also Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public Sector Unions in
America?, The Atlantic (June 27, 2018),https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janusafscme-public-sector-unions/563879/; Bradley Marianno, Analysis: From the High Court to the
Picket Line - How the Janus CaseEmboldened Teachers Union & Make Strikes Key to Their Survival,
The 74, (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.the74million.org/article/analysis-from-the-high-court-to-thepicket-line-how-the-janus-case-emboldened-teachers-unions-made-strikes-key-to-their-survival/.
290.
See Richard Hurd, The Failureof Organizing,the New Unity Partnership,and the Future
of the Labor Movement, 8 WORKINGUSA: J. OF LAB. & Soc'Y 5, 7, 9 (2004).
291.
Id. at 10-12.
292.
See Robert W. Welsh, Building and Changing: A New Beginning at the AFL-CIO, in
AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY: LABOR, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA 73, 83 (Steven Fraser and Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997).
293.
See THE J. LEGIS. COMM. ON THE TAYLOR L., PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT
ACT 1971-72 REP., 25, at 36 (1972), http://www.perb.ny.gov/pdf/1971jlc.pdf.
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resources into persuading alienated or philosophical dissenters and passive non-joiners into becoming active union members.294
The
reemergence of coordinated internal organizing campaigns and labor activism in the face of Janushighlights the prior union passivity toward empowering all bargaining unit members through union membership and activism.29'
The success or failure of those campaigns may have a
substantial role in determining the long-term impact of the open shop that
has been imposed by the Court in Janus.296
IIl. THE ECLIPSE
States have the ultimate power over state and local bargaining-they
can create, shape, or eliminate the right or ability to bargain.297 This principle, premised on federalism, has been undermined by the holding and
rationale in Janus.298 Indeed, the normally pro-federalism conservative
Justices, as Justice Kagan notes in her dissent, have reversed their usual
stance, compelling uniformity among the states, with evident satisfaction:
"the majority is bursting with pride over what it has accomplished: Now
those 22 States, it crows, 'can follow the model of the federal government
299
and 28 other States."',
Furthermore, the majority's decision is in tension with the Court's
prior decisions holding that the First Amendment does not exempt individuals from financially supporting government speech initiatives (even
ifin conjunction with private entities) through their taxes generally or direct compelled subsidies, or from requirements to limit their speech on
matters of public concerns when operating pursuant to government
300
grants.
Nevertheless, another primary influencer of Janus' ultimate impact

294.

Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Feesand the FirstAmendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1053-

54 (2018).
295. Justin Miller, Janus: A New Attack PresentsOld Challengesfor Unions, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT (Oct. 24, 2017), https://prospect.org/article/janus-new-attack-presents-old-challenges-un-

ions.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Slater, supra note 235, at 512-13.
298. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2487, 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
299. Id.at 2501.
300. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-469 (2009) (holding that
municipalities are free to spend taxes to promote its own message); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 556 (2005) (holding compelled subsidization of government message devised
by "Beef Board" including private beef producers in favor of beef consumption via special assessment
constitutional); National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-588 (1998); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192, 203 (1991).
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will be state legislative action to enhance or ameliorate the loss of com301
pelled agency fees, and how the Court will treat those actions on review.
Meanwhile, states will continue to pass legislation whose impact on the
local level, combined with increased organization, may eclipse that of
compelled agency fees.30 2
A.

The Power of State Legislation
1. The PotentialImpact of Janus
The concerns expressed by unions and scholars in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Janus are not illusory.30 3 As Benjamin Sachs
has phrased it,
[a]gency fees are the sole means through which unions
have been permitted to overcome what otherwise would
be an existential collective action problem. In brief, unions have a legal obligation to provide benefits to all
workers in a given workplace or bargaining unit. Unionnegotiated benefits therefore have the character of public
goods: if a union negotiates a wage increase, or better benefits package, or enhanced safety and health protections,
these improvements must be extended to all the workers
covered by the collective agreement. If unions are required to rely for their financing on voluntary payments
from these workers, then unions would face extensive free
riding by all those workers who would rather receive benefits for free than pay for them."
However, this constitutionalization of "right to work" differs in a
highly significant way from the legislatively enacted "right to work" regimes currently extant in the states that have adopted them.30 5 In such
states, the statutory regime presents the "existential collective action problem" described by Benjamin Sachs: the unions are both required to
equally represent the interests of all employees in the defined bargaining
units, whether they are members of the union or not, but are only permitted to receive voluntary dues from members, that is, employees who elect

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2499-50.
INT'L BHD. OF ELEC. WORKERS: MEDIA CTR., supra note 286.
Sachs, supra note 294, at 1047.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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to join the union.3" 6 The construction in Janus of the First Amendment to
prohibit mandatory agency fees imposes on every public sector workplace
the first prong of a "right-to-work" regime.3 °7
The second prong, the scope of the union's duty to represent all of
the employees in a bargaining unit, is a creature of state law, and extension
of that duty to non-members is neither explicitly compelled by the Janus
ruling, nor inherent, or even supported, by its logic.30 8
In Harrisv. Quinn,3 °9 a direct antecedent of Janus,31 ° the Court found
"unwarranted" what it called an "unsupported empirical assumption,
namely, that the principle of exclusive representation in the public sector
is dependent on a union or agency shop. '3 11 To the contrary, the Court
opined, "[a] union's status as exclusive bargaining agent and the right 3to
12
collect an agency fee from non-members are not inextricably linked.,
That being so, exclusivity, like the duty of fair representation, remains a
matter of state law entirely separate from the "compelled speech" and
"compelled association" found to be imposed by agency fee statutes and
even collective bargaining agreements in Janus.3" 3 As a matter of history,
virtually all state collective bargaining statutes have imposed the exclusive collective representation model to ensure harmonious labor relations,
thereby rejecting as unsound the earlier plural representation system that
existed prior to collective bargaining.31 4
In the majority opinion in Janus, the Court argues that unions do not
have a reasonable reliance interest in adhering to Abood.3" 5 This contention could play a key role in how the Court answers claims to apply Janus
retroactively, and its fundamental unsoundness is therefore all the more
problematic. The argument is strikingly premised on prognostication of
future action that might be taken by the Court, in that it casts upon the
unions the burden of predicting whether the expressions of disagreement
with the rationale of Abood will lead the Court to overrule it:

Sachs, supra note 294, at 1047.
306.
307. See Brief for the City of New York as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 190, at 24-25; see also Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2458, 2459.
308. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2467-68."
309. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2634 (2014).
310. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2464-65.
Harris, 134 S.Ct. at 2634.
311.
312. Id.at 2640.
313. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465-66, 2468.
314.
William A. Herbert and Joseph A. McCartin, Janus's Progeny? A Supreme Court Threat
to Majority Rule Looms, The American Prospect, (Mar. 21, 2019) https://prospect.org/article/anuss-

progeny-supreme-court-threat-majority-rule-looms.
315. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2460, 2484.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law,

43

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

[P]ublic-sector unions have been on notice for years regarding this Court's misgivings about Abood. In Knox,
decided in 2012, we described Abood as a First Amendment "anomaly." Two years later in Harris, we were
asked to overrule Abood, and while we found it unnecessary to take that step, we cataloged Abood's many weaknesses. In 2015, we granted a petition for certiorari asking
us to review a decision that sustained an agency-fee arrangement under Abood. After exhaustive briefing and argument on the question whether Abood should be overruled, we affirmed the decision below by an equally
divided vote. During this period of time, any public sector
union seeking an agency-fee provision in a collective bargaining agreement must have understood that the consti3 16
tutionality of such a provision was uncertain.
Leaving aside the fact that many of the unions affected by Janus did
not negotiate agency fee provisions in their contracts, but operated in
states in which state law mandated agency fees be deducted, the Court's
delineation in Janus of what constitutes reasonable reliance interests both
contravenes logic and invites chaos.3 17 The Janus Court's analysis attributes to the "Court" dicta the majority expressed in an opinion that reflects
a closely split bench, and requires the unions to predict future litigated
outcomes. It does so while glossing over factors that would, in fact, be
dispositive of that very issue, that is, the effect of the change in the Court's
3 18
membership after Knox and Harris.
In sum, the Court's reliance argument requires a prediction, but one divorced from the realities that might
make it a meaningfully accurate prediction.
As a threshold matter, while the Court did criticize the rationale of
Abood in Knox and Harris,neither case purported to overrule Abood, but
rather refused to extend it to analogous circumstances. 319 The assumption
that the accompanying criticism of Abood's reasoning should have put
unions on notice that Abood was clearly doomed, and that they were obligated to presume that result and take action by waiving agency fees
(even if only where state law permits) flips the normal analysis.3 2 ° As
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his dissent in South Dakota v. Wayfair,
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at2484-85.
Id.
Id. at 2483.
Id.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484.
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Inc., "[w]hatever salience the adage 'third time's a charm' has in daily
life, it is a poor guide to Supreme Court decisionmaking. 3 2'
The Chief Justice's logic applies with especial force to Janus, as both
Knox and Harriswere decided by the same 5-4 majority, and that majority
was broken by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13,
2016.322 As a result of Justice Scalia's death, the majority that had criticized, refused to extend, and might possibly have overruled Abood, ceased
to exist. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit decision following Abood was
"affirmed by an equally divided Court" in Friedrichsv. California Teachers Association, decided on March 29, 2016.323
By that time, of course, D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick Garland,
had already been nominated to the Supreme Court, and Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell had announced his refusal to consider the nomination.324 From that time through the expiration of Judge Garland's nomination, the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court on April 7,
2018, and the oral argument in Janus (at which Justice Gorsuch was enJudge Garland (had he
tirely silent), no indication existed as to how either
325
been confirmed) or Justice Gorsuch would vote.
Subsequent to the breaking of the Knox-Harris majority, the only
factor upon which unions could have based any prediction of the outcome
of Janus was the fact that Justice Gorsuch was appointed by a Republican
President, Donald J. Trump. 326 However, unanimity among conservative
scholars did not exist concerning the merits of Janus's First Amendment
argument, as demonstrated by the amicus brief submitted by Professors
Eugene Volokh and William Baude 327 Moreover, requiring unions to
base their predictions solely on party affiliation rejects the Court's longheld ethos, recently reasserted by Chief Justice Roberts, that "[w]e do not

321.
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2102 (2018).
Adam Liptak, Justice Scalia, Who Led Court's Conservative Renaissance,DiesAt 79, N.Y.
322.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. According to Justice Scalia's obituary, he was found dead on the morning of February 13, 2016; whether he
died that day or on February 12 is unclear. Id.
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
323.
324.
Michael D. Shear, Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Gardiner Harris, Obama Chooses Merrick
https://www.nyTIMES
(Mar.
17,
2016)
Court,
N.Y.
Garland for
Supreme
times.com/201 6/03/1 7/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html.
325.
Adam Liptak, Key Voice Is Silent in Supreme Court Caseon Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-gorsuch.html.
326. Id.
327.
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and William Baude as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/16/161466/28495/20180119145640767 16-1466 Janus%20v.%o20American%/o20Federation%20of%/o20State%/o20et.%/o20al..pdf.
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have Obama judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges." For the unions affected by the ultimate outcome in Janus to be required to assume the overruling of Abood after the death of Justice Scalia, would require a complete
abandonment of faith in the judicial process and the legitimacy of judicial
review itself. Nor should prescient complex political calculations based
on unfolding, rapidly shifting facts be the prerequisite of demonstrating
reasonable reliance on non-overruled, albeit controversial, precedent.
2. Ameliorating the Janus Effect
A non-frivolous reverse-Janus argument could be constructed, pursuant to which the Court's free association and free speech cases would
require the application of strict scrutiny to justify any regime that mandated a union to provide advocacy services to non-members.3 28 Similarly,
the recognition in Janus that collective negotiations constitutes political
speech under the First Amendment can form the basis for an argument
that prohibitions or restrictions on public sector collective bargaining are
unconstitutional.3 29
With the Court's new recognition of public sector collective bargaining as inherently political speech, statutorily required advocacy on behalf
of specific individuals who are inimical to the union would present questions of both compelled association and compelled speech, although the
Court suggests that exclusivity is a sufficient "boon" to unions to warrant
the imposition of the duty of fair representation to non-members. 330 The
corollary then would be that if a successor case invalidates exclusivity,
then the imposition of any duty of fair representation toward non-members would constitute compelled speech.33 ' In a similar vein, a state's
banning or the restriction of the political speech inherent in negotiations,

328. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (explaining that forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes on the group's freedom of expressive association
if presence of that person affects, in a significant way, the group's ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints); Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 32 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting continued
validity of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale); State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 718 F.3d
126, 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that it is well-settled that, apart from applicable statutory rights
to union organization and membership, "[i]ncluded in th[e] [Constitutional] right to free association is
the right of employees to associate in unions," and that it "cannot 'be questioned that the First Amendment's protection of speech and associational rights extends to labor union activities."') (citing
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Conn. State Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir.1976)).
329. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460, 2462.
330. Id. at 2467-68.

331. See id. at 2469 ("[The duty of fair representation] is a necessary concomitant of the authority that a union seeks when it chooses to serve as the exclusive representative of all the employees in
a unit.").
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as found in Janus, would logically constitute unlawful prior restraint.
The Court itself suggested two forms of ameliorating the effect of
Janus in forcing unions to shoulder the burden of providing individual
representation to non-members in disciplinary and other individualized
grievances. The Court stated that less restrictive measures than requiring
all non-members to pay an agency fee were available. It gave as examples
pay for that service or
that "[i]ndividual nonmembers could be required to
333
altogether.,
representation
union
could be denied
Any reasonable reading of Janus suggests that the Court will be exacting in its scrutiny of legislative or state judicial response to the decision
that goes beyond the scope of the duty of fair representation.3 34 The heavy
weight given by the majority opinion to the economic cost of public employee wages and benefits 335 suggests that Justice Kennedy's dismissal of
the description of the State's interest in collective bargaining by the Solicitor General of Illinois may be reflective of the views of other members
of the Court:
MR. FRANKLIN: You know, the state's interest here, if
I can spend just a few moments talking about that, is, first,
we have an interest in dealing with a single spokesman for
the-for the employees. Second, we have an interest in
imposing on that spokesman a legal duty to represent everyone. But as regards [sic] agency fees, they are complementary to those first two interests. They serve our managerial interests in two ways. First, they allow us to avoid
a situation where some employees bear the cost of representing others who contribute nothing. That kind of twotiered workplace would be corrosive to our ability to cultivate collaboration, cohesion, good working relationships among our personnel. Second, independent of that,
we have an interest at the end of the day in being able to
work with a stable, responsible, independent counterparty
that's well-resourced enough that it can be a partner with
us in the process of not only contract negotiation-

332.

See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 471 (1995).

333.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at2468-69.

334. Id. at 2464.
335. Id. at 2483 ("Unsustainable collective-bargaining agreements have also been blamed for
multiple municipal bankruptcies.").
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JUSTICE KENNEDY: It can be a partner with you in advocating for a greater size workforce, against privatization, against merit promotion, against - for teacher tenure,
for higher wages, for massive government, for increasing
bonded indebtedness, for increasing
taxes? That's 336
that's the interest the state has?
Against this backdrop, then, any legislative effort to ameliorate the
effect of Janus would be much less susceptible to Supreme Court review
to the extent that it modifies the scope of the duty of fair representation,
and it would be more subject to constitutional challenge to the extent that
it makes it more difficult for those employees who wish to not pay dues
or other fees to the union.3 37
In the former area, Janus does nothing to suggest that states are not
free to either permit member-only unions, allowing unions the freedom to
refuse requests for representation from non-members, or, in the altemative, to charge non-members for union representation services provided to
such non-members who require discrete individual representation,
whether in individual (as opposed to group or unit-wide) grievances or
statutory disciplinary procedures. 338 Indeed, this last possibility finds support in Janus itself, in which the Court expressly stated that "[i]ndividual
nonmembers could be required to pay for that service or could be denied
union representation altogether." 339 This finding of the Court appears to
have originated in Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lehnert, in which he
found that "[w]here the state imposes upon the union a duty to deliver
services, it may permit the union to demand reimbursement for them; or,
looked at from the other end, where the state creates in the nonmembers340a
legal entitlement from the union, it may compel them to pay the cost.
These judicial observations relate to what options may be permissi-

336.

Transcript of Oral Argument, Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council

31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/2017/16-1466_i425.pdf
337.
See Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2468-69 (noting that unions owe a duty of fair representation to all
employees, members and non-members alike, and that unions may not intentionally discriminate
against non-members based on their choice to not join the union).
338. See FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (2018) (a statutory exception which allows unions to refuse to
process grievances of non-members); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2468-69 (stating that a union may require
compensation from non-members should the union represent them, or that the union may deny to

represent the non-member outright in a grievance).
339.
340.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
Lehnert v. Ferris Fac. Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
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ble under the First Amendment. The determination concerning public policy choices in a post-Janus world will be left to state legislatures. Inevitably, stakeholders including unions and public employers will present
their views to those legislative bodies.
Public policy, like flowers, does not grow in a vacuum. In developing
ameliorative legislative responses to Janus,34 1 the states would be well
advised to consider the views of unions and public employers concerning
whether proposed measures will create greater divisions between members and nonmembers in a bargaining unit, and whether permitting nonexclusive grievance representation might adversely impact the substantive
terms of the negotiated agreements.34 2 If so, lawmakers must consider if
the ameliorative effect compensates for such division and effect on the
collective bargaining agreements, if any. Whether proposed legislation
makes public policy sense will vary based on the context of each state.
It is important for policy makers to recognize that natural tensions
can arise between the majority and the minority within a bargaining
unit. 343 Such tensions can be an outgrowth of the representational election, or can stem from differing interests and perspectives of employees
within a bargaining unit. The potential for the latter-type of tensions
formed the basis for criticism of majority rule collective bargaining prior
to the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. 3 "
Prior to Janus, the only outlier to the exclusive representation model
was the open shop state of Florida, where its public sector labor law statute

341. See Sarah Cudahy & John Henry, FiguringOut the FutureFee Fallout:An Indiana-Centric
Insight into Public Sector Agency Fees, N.Y. ST. B.A., May 11, 2018, at 10,
https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=82110 (discussing how state legislatures
largely affect collective bargaining and other union practices).
342. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2468 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58,
n. 19 (1974) (noting that, by controlling the grievance process, a union may "effectively subordinate
'the interests of [an] individual employee ... to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit' and that the "resolution of one employee's grievance can affect others"); SCHILLER,
infra note 343, at 121 (discussing how, when unions voted for the statutory repeal of California's Fair
Housing Act, tension was caused between African American members and the rest of the union).
343. See REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF
POSTWAR LIBERALISM 121 (2015).
344. See CLETUS E. DANIEL, THE ACLU AND THE WAGNER ACT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
DEPRESSION-ERA CRISIS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 34 (1980) (citing the concerns by the ACLU's

Roger Baldwin that exclusive representation would substantially impair the rights of a dissenting faction); CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 69 (2005) ("On the other side of the debate [over the NLRA], the employer
lobby advocated plurality bargaining, opposed the majority rule as a denial of the rights of minorities,
and asserted that the Board's authority to determine the bargaining unit would lead to a closed shop.").
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states that a certified union is not "required to process grievances for employees who are not members of the organization." 345 Florida's partial
statutory exception to exclusive representation has been interpreted to permit a union to refuse to process an individual's grievance concerning an
issue that predates his or her membership.34 6
While Janus was pending, New York State anticipated the decision's potential effects, and sought to ameliorate them through legislation.3 47 The New York State Legislature enacted, and, on April 12, 2018,
Governor Andrew Cuomo signed, legislation intended to stabilize collective bargaining from its effect, by enacting into law new provisions that:
(1) facilitating dues collection from members, by requiring that dues are
promptly collected by employers and promptly forwarded to the unions;
(2) allowing the deduction of dues to continue unless revoked by the member "in accordance with the terms of the signed authorization," and resuming such deductions upon the members return from any leave, voluntary
or involuntary, or upon separation for a year or less; (3) facilitating union
enrollment of new members, allowing dues authorizations through electronic signatures, and making sure unions are aware of and able to reach
new hires, and further providing that union representatives have an opportunity to meet with new employees at the worksite during worktime; (4)
addressing in part the "free rider" problem by amending the law so that

345.
FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (2018).
346.
19 F.P.E.R. 24111(1993); see Dennis 0. Lynch, Incomplete Exclusivity and FairRepresentation: Inevitable Tensions in Florida'sPublic Sector LaborLaw, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 573, 574
intro. (1983) (providing an extensive critique and analysis concerning Florida's exception to the exclusive representation model).
347.
2018 N.Y. Laws, ch. 59, Part RRR. In part, this action was impelled by the part-time nature
of the State Legislature. See New York State - Legislative Session Calendar,NEW YORK STATE
ASSEMBLY, https://nyassembly.gov/leg/calendar/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). The decision in Janus
was widely (and correctly) expected to issue at the end of the current term, that is, in "late June or
early July."
See The Court and Its Procedures, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/procedures.aspx. (last visited Jan. 2, 2019). Although it was theoretically possible that the decision might issue earlier, controversial decisions such as Janus tend to be "issued in
June... and mostly in the last week or two of June." Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Best for Last: The Timing of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 64 Duke L.J. 991, 993
(2015). The New York State legislative session, however, normally runs from January through June,
with the last session day of the 2017-2018 session scheduled to fall on Wednesday, June 20, 2018.
See New York State - Legislative Session Calendar,NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, https://nyassembly.gov/leg/docs/sessioncalendar 2018.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). Thus, the Governor and the
Legislature had to assume that the opinion in Janus might very well not issue before the end of the
session, requiring either (1) acting during session, in advance of knowing the actual outcome; (2)
convening a special session in a heatedly contested election year; or (3) waiting until the next session,
beginning in January 2019, with no guarantee that the political coalitions favorable to such action
would still be in place. See id.; see also The Court and Its Procedures, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/procedures.aspx. (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
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unions do not have to represent non-members during questioning by the
employer or in disciplinary cases "where the non-member is permitted to
proceed without the employee organization and be represented by his or
her own advocate"; and (5) further addressing the "free-riding" problem
by amending the law to make clear that unions have the right to provide
legal services, or economic benefits or services outside of a collective bargaining agreement, and that they have the right to limit those services or
benefits to members only. 34 8 A review of various bills adopted or introduced in other states is useful to demonstrate additional possible ameliorative paths.349
Shortly after the enactment of the New York statute, New Jersey
passed its "Workplace Democracy Enhancement Act," which was signed
into law on May 18, 2018.350 The New Jersey Act, like the New York
statute, requires public employers to provide information relating to new
hires and opportunities for union representatives to meet with such new
hires at the worksite during business hours.3 5' It further provides that a
"public employer shall not encourage negotiations unit members to resign
or relinquish membership in an exclusive representative employee organization and shall not encourage negotiations unit members to revoke authorization of the deduction of fees to an exclusive representative employee organization. 3 52 Finally, the Act preserves exclusive
representation by including part-time employees with full time employees
performing the same work, and accretes any part-time employees previously excluded from a unit due to the limited number of hours to the appropriate unit. Previous similar access-based statutes had been enacted
on March 27, 2018, by the State of Washington,3 53 April 5, 2018, by Maryland,3 54 and in 2017 by California, which makes impasses relating to un355
ion access to bargaining unit members subject to interest arbitration.

348. Id. In 2019, the New York Legislature also extinguished any state law claims based on
agency fee deductions that occurred prior to the issuance of Janus.NY Laws 2019, Ch. 56, Part. DD.
The provisions endeavoring to redress the "free-rider" problems are consonant with the Court's finding that with respect to individual representation of nonmembers, "[i]ndividual nonmembers could be
required to pay for that service or could be denied union representation altogether." Janus, 138 S. Ct.

at 2468-69.
349.
S.B. 2137, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
350. Id.
351. Id. (providing for time limits for such meetings and encouraging negotiation regarding the
times and places of such meetings, with resort to the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission to resolve any issues the parties cannot agree upon).

352.

Id.

353.
354.
355.

2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1467-68.
H.R. 1017, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2018 (Md. 2018).
Assemb. B. 119, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Cal. 2017) (enacting similar access rights
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Effective January 1, 2019, California also requires public employers to
grant reasonable leaves to employees to serve as union officers and stewards to provide representation.35 6
A broader approach, one that was raised during the pendency of Friedrichs, and may also be reconsidered, is the limitation of the union's duty
of fair representation solely to members.35 7 However, this option raises
significant concerns as well.358 Having two classes of employees in a
workplace would undermine the core concept of exclusivity, by which
employers only have to reach agreement with one bargaining agent for a
title or cluster of titles. 359 Self-represented non-union employees would
either problematically have different rights than union members or could,
if allowed to pursue their own personal cases, such as disciplinary cases,
effectively take control of a contract to which they are neither a party nor
a beneficiary.
A bill in Massachusetts introduced in 2017, but neither passed nor
rejected, would take a sterner tack than even that of severing the duty of
fair representation to nonmembers; it provides simply that:
If an agency service fee is not negotiated in the collective
bargaining agreement the fair share provision shall apply
to any employee who chooses not to join the union by
paying to the union a percentage equal for negotiations for
wages, benefits and working conditions and grievance
and arbitration rights. Failure of an employee to pay the
fair share provision shall exclude him from any and all
relief of the collective bargaining agreement with the exception of the negotiated COLA increases.360

to new employee orientations and rights to obtain contact information). Likewise, similar access and
informational requirements are contained within Senate Bill No. 238, which has, as of this writing,
not yet passed the Vermont General Assembly.
356.S.B. 1085, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2018 (Cal 2018); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3558.8 (2018).
357. Friedrichs,136 S. Ct. 1083. Such a provision already exists in Florida's Section 447.401,
which provides "that certified employee organizations shall not be required to process grievances for
employees who are not members of the organization." FLA. STAT. § 447.401 (2018). Under this
section, the Florida Public Employment Relations Commission ruled that a union did not violate its
duty of fair representation by revoking an employee's membership, returning his dues, and refusing
to process a grievance with respect to events that preceded the employee joining the union. Id.; Polk
Educ. Assn.,. 19 F.P.E.R. 24111 (1993); see also Lynch, supra note 346, at 573.
358. Lynch, supra note 346, at 573.

359.

Id. at 576.

360.

H.R. 1335, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017-2018 (Ma. 2017). According to the track-

ing information, the bill has neither been passed nor rejected. Id.
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An alternative approach drafted but not enacted by the Hawaii Legislature during the pendency of the Friedrichscase36 1, would require the
State and/or other public employers to appropriate a "Public Employees'
Collective Bargaining Fund" to directly replace the lost revenue to unions."' This public option seems unrealistic and unworkable, based on
state budgetary limitations.3 63 Moreover, the perceived resultant dependence of the unions on the State or other public employers could delegitimize the very unions the proposal seeks to support. In fact, the idea was
considered and rejected 50 years ago by the City of New York.36 4 Finally,
the potential unconstitutionality under Janus itself of a public employer
seemingly seeking to recoup from employees via payroll deductions (in
the Hawaii bill) or in negotiations (in academic support of such a proposal) the monies expended by the Fund poses a significant difficulty.36 5
of
So too does the effect of mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions
366
employment created by unilaterally imposed recouping methods.
The Vermont General Assembly has neither adopted nor rejected an- "
other option, one that provides that "a nonmember who avails himself or
herself of the unit representative in grievance proceedings shall be reof representquired to reimburse the unit representative for the actual cost
' 367
ing the employee in relation to the grievance proceedings."
While the question of reimbursement for union costs in representation cuts to the heart of the challenge posed by Janus-aunion's ability
to remain an effective collective bargaining agent, and to provide services,
limiting the funds to actual costs could be read narrowly, in such a way as
to exclude ongoing costs (staffing legal departments, providing expert and
experienced grievance representatives).3 68 Such a narrow reading could
-

361.
H.R. 1886, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2016 (Haw. 2016).
H.R. 923, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Haw. 2017).
362.
363. See generally STATE OF HAW. DEP'T OF BUDGET & FIN., THE FY 2019 ExECUTIVE
SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET: BUDGET IN BRIEF at iv (2017).

364. Memorandum from the Office of the Corp. Counsel to the Labor Policy Comm., to the
Office of the Mayor (July 9, 1968) (on file with City of New York Department of Records & Information Services, Municipal Archives, John V. Lindsay Files, Box 58, Folder 1094 Labor Policy Agency Shop 1968-1969).
365.
Tucker Higgins, In a Blow to Public Sector Unions, Supreme Court Overturns 40-YearOld Precedent,CNBC (June 27, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/27/supreme-court-

rules-in-janus-labor-union-case.html.
366. See Haw. H.R. 1886; see generally Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, the FirstAmendment, and the Costs of Collective Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2016) (advocating for such a
system, with recouping through withdrawal of non-bargained benefits, and negotiating lower future
wages).
367. S.B. 238, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017-2018 (Vt. 2018).
368.

Bob Hennelly, Federal Unions Show How to Survive Even Without Agency Fees, THE

CHIEF (Mar. 5, 2018), http://thechiefleader.com/news/openarticles/federal-unions-show-how-to-
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lead to the union continuing to subsidize nonmembers.369 While not a
straightforward panacea, the refraining of this notion as a "fee for services" model could370 be useful but could also undermine traditional concepts of unionism.

The questions of how non-members would access the process if they
choose not to retain the union at a fee, and, conversely, of determining
what limits, if any, should apply to a union's discretion to set fees, would
need to be fleshed out. Any fee imposed would be subject to challenge,
just as the amount of agency fees were litigated prior to Janus. 37 1 A potential workable "fee for services" model, to avoid constitutional and state
statutory problems would most likely be effective only if it: (1) allows for
nonmembers to voluntarily opt in to pay an agency fee (possibly minus
the political component under Hudson) as a form of insurance entitling
the non-member to personal representation on the same terms and conditions as members; (2) allows the union to charge a reasonable fee to any
non-agency fee paying non-member who receives individual representation services from the union (e.g., representation for a grievance, or disciplinary procedure); (3) defines a "reasonable fee" through adaptation of
the well-established "lodestar" criteria applied by the federal and state
courts with respect to attorneys and other professional fees, allowing
hourly compensation for all work reasonably performed in the representation, with the hourly rate set by criteria based on the local market, qualifications of the individuals providing service, and other specified criteria;
and (4) requires that the union shall not discriminate against non-members
in determining whether, to what extent, and how to provide representation. Extensive litigation, however, could result that challenges both the
model and its application.
While the aftermath of Janus in the states that favor collective bargaining is unclear, these states have multiple policy options open to them,
should they choose to continue to protect the institution of collective bargaining.3 72 Some of these options include aspects that may generate fur-

survive-even-without-agency-fees/article_9a78c582-1663-11 e8-a65a-53ccb6e62108.html.
369.
Don Gonyea, Labor Clout Takes a Hit in Supreme Court Ruling on Dues, NPR (June 30,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/30/624513403/labor-clout-takes-a-hit-in-supremecourt-ruling-on-dues.
370.
Sue Carney, We're Not a Fee-for-Service Organization, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS
UNION, http://www.apwu.org/news/deptdiv-news-article/we're-not-fee-service-organization
(last

visited Feb. 2, 2019).
371.
CELINE McNICHOLAS ET. AL., JANUS AND FAIR SHARE FEES: THE ORGANIZATIONS
FINANCING THE ATTACK ON UNIONS' ABILITY TO REPRESENT WORKERS 3 (Econ. Policy Inst. 2018).

372.

Daniel Hemel & David Louk, How to Save Public Sector Unions, SLATE (June 27, 2018,
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ther constitutional litigation by burdening or penalizing an employee's exercise of her or his right to not join a union.373 These options will be, most
likely, subject to exacting or strict scrutiny.374 Those options which center
on the state law duty of fair representation, and particularly embrace individual choice, are most likely to face and withstand less searching review
but raise public policy considerations that will differ based upon the political context of each state.
3. Recent Non-Agency-Fee Labor Legislation
Janus has overshadowed other recent labor legislation that has the
potential to have a greater impact on unions and employees.3 75 Indeed,
some states have proposed to, or have, changed the coverage of collective
bargaining laws. 376 California extended collective bargaining rights to
various court employees and student employees.3 77 In Nevada, school ad37 8
ministrators, including principals, can now bargain regardless of salary.
Bills to expand collective bargaining have been introduced in New Hampshire (state legislative and judicial branches), New York (farm laborers),
and North Dakota (public safety employees).37 9 Other laws have sought
to restrict bargaining. Iowa limited collective bargaining rights for nonsafety public employees.38 ° A Kansas bill proposed to significantly narrow the scope of bargaining for school employees.38 1 Indiana expanded
the subjects for which employers can pay non-bargained bonuses for
12:23 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/supreme-courts-janus-decision-how-bluestates-can-still-save-public-sector-unions.html.
373.
Lisa Guerin, Right to Work, Union Shops, and Union Dues: Can Employees Be Required
to Join A Union or Pay Dues?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/employee-rights-book/chapterl 5-5.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
374.
Cornell University School of Law, First Amendment. Freedom of Association, LEGAL
INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/supreme court_20132014_term highlights/first amendment freedom of association (last visited Feb.
2,2019).
INFORMATION

375.

See Collective Bargaining and Labor Union Legislation Database 2018-2019, NAT'L

(2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx.
376. Hemel & Louk, supra note 372.
377. Assemb. B. 83, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Cal. 2017) (providing collective bargaining rights to court employees); S.B. 201, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Cal. 2017) (providing
collective bargaining rights to student employees).
378. S.B. 493, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Nev. 2017) (providing collective bargaining
rights to school administrators).
379. H.R. 1432, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2016 (N.H. 2016); S. 1291, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
2015-2016 (N.Y. 2015); H.R. 1401, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2017 (N.D. 2017).
380. H.R. DOc. NO. 291, 87th Gen. Assemb., at 1-2 (Iowa 2017).
381. S.B 176, Kan. Leg., Reg. Sess. 2015 (Kan. 2015).
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
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teachers, and in a special legislative session eliminated collective bargaining rights for teachers in one financially distressed school corporation.3 82
Another area of increased legislation requires that unions recertify to
remain the exclusive representative, instead of allowing the exclusive representative to continue as such until being decertified in a representation
election or voluntarily relinquishing their position. These laws typically
require recertification either for all unions after certain time frames, or for
unions whose membership is below a majority of unit members. 383 For
example, in Iowa, unions must now receive votes from a majority of unit
employees in an election prior to negotiating a new contract. 384 Legislation requiring unions to win elections at regular intervals to remain the
exclusive representative have been introduced in Washington, Maine,
New Jersey, Missouri, Florida, Oklahoma, and Illinois." 5 In Indiana,
teachers' unions must certify membership numbers annually.3 86 If the
number of union members is less than a majority of unit members, a letter
is sent to every bargaining unit member explaining a teacher's right to
representation and to change representatives or decertify their exclusive
representative. 387
Although these laws and proposed laws only impact the employees
and unions in their states, together they impact many employees and in a
more significant way than agency fees.388 They also highlight trends that
389
are likely to continue.
382. See H.R. 1315, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Special Sess. 2018 (Ind. 2018); see also IND. CODE
ANN. § 20-28-9-1.5(a) (2018).
383. See Union Recertification Act: Summary, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Sept. 18,
2018), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/union-recertification/.
384. Iowa H.R. DOc. No. 291.
385. See, e.g., H.R. 1607, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Wash. 2017); S.B. 544, 128th Leg., Reg.
Sess. 2017 (Me. 2017); Assemb. B. 3692, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2016 (N.J. 2016); S.B. 806, 98th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); H.R. 11, Fla. Leg., Reg. Sess. 2017 (Fla. 2017); S.B. 597,
56th Leg., I st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); H.R. 1767, 56th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); H.R. 3219,
100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2017-2018 (Ill. 2017).
386. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-5-7 (West 2018).
387. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-29-5-7, 5-8 (West 2018); 560 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-2.1-20
(West 2019); 560 IAC 2-2.1-20 (2018).
388. See Jacquie Lee, Will Iowa's Union Recertification Law Create a Domino Effect?,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/iowas-union-recertification-n57982087768/;
see also Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Ethan Porter, How Teachers Unions Can Survive, VOX (Jul.
17, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/7/17/17578832/teachers-unions-janusstrategy-labor-movement-agency-fees; Caroline Glenn, New Law Could JeopardizeBrevard Teachers Union - If They Don't Scrounge Up More Members, FLORIDA TODAY (Mar. 15, 2018, 2:15 PM),
https://www.floridatoday.com/story/news/2018/03/15/new-law-could-jeopardize-brevard-teachersunion/421860002/.
389. See Lee, supra note 388; see also Caroline Glenn, New Law Could Jeopardize Brevard
Teachers Union -If They Don'tScrounge Up More Members, FLORIDA TODAY (Mar. 15, 2018,2:15
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Another trend to watch for will be the ways used to externally pressure state legislatures. 390 As recent teacher unrest in a half-dozen states
shows, statewide protests can result in statutory changes.39 1 And since
Janus, there has been an increased number of teacher strikes in previously
agency fee states.392 However, striking is often illegal for public sector
unions and can carry severe penalties, such as being prohibited from representing employees for at least 10 years. 39 3 Where available, some unions are using ballot measures to achieve state action.39 4 In August 2018,
67.5% of Missouri voters overturned the private right-to-work law passed
in 2017. 39 Although the purpose of protests and ballot measures is to
change the laws of that state, the more places that external pressure is applied make it more likely that other legislatures will feel the pressure and
act, even if there is no protest or ballot in their state. For example, after
the wave of teachers strikes in 2018 and 2019, teacher compensation became one of the-if not the-biggest topic for the 2019 Indiana General

https://www.floridatoday.com/story/news/2018/03/15/new-law-could-jeopardize-brevardPM),
teachers-union/421860002/.
390.

See Michelle Exstrom, Teacher Pay Is a Problem, 44 ST. LEGISLATURES: NAT'L CONF. OF

ST. LEGISLATURES, no.6, June 2018, at 22, 22 (demonstrating that pressure to raise salaries, support
pensions and restore education funding to pre-recession levels are pressures that lawmakers have been
faced with).
391. Jess Bidgood, West Virginia Raises Teachers' Pay to End Statewide Strike, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/west-virginia-teachers-strike-deal.html;
Elizabeth Behrman, Strike Averted After Pittsburgh Public Schools, Teachers Union Reach Tentative
Deal, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:57 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/education!2018/02/27/Pittsburgh-Public-Schools-Federation-of-Teachers-contractnegotiations-strike-agreement-union/stories/201802270201; Dana Goldstein, Their Pay Has Stood
Still. Now Oklahoma Teachers Could Be the Next to Walk, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/us/oklahoma-teachers-strike.html; Robert Gebeloff, The Numbers That Explain Why Teachers Are in Revolt: After A QuarterCentury of Steady Growth On Education Spending, A Shock to the System, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/upshot/school-funding-sti11-lags-after-recession-ended.html; Anya Kamenetz,
NPR/IPSOSPoll: Most Americans Support Teachers' Right to Strike, NPR (Apr. 26, 2018, 5:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/04/26/604117045/npr-ipsos-poll-most-americans-supportteachers-right-to-strike.
392. Alia Wong, America's Teachers Are Furious:From West Virginia to Los Angeles, educators are ushering in a new era of labor activism, The Atlantic (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/01/teachers-are-launching-a-rebellion/580975/.
393. See SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 236; IND. CODE ANN. § 36-8-22-15(d) (West 2018)
("An exclusive recognized representative that engages in or sanctions a strike loses the right to represent the employees for at least ten (10) years after the date of the action").
394. See Liz Farmer, In States With Teacher Strikes, Voters Refuse to Raise EducationFunding,
GOVERNING (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:49 AM), http://www.governing.com/week-in-finance/gov-financeroundup-teacher-raises-ballot.html; Mich. Proposal 2-12.
395. Hallie Detrick, Missouri Voters Rejected the "Right to Work"- Here's Why That Matters,
FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2018) http://fortune.com/2018/08/08/missouri-right-to-work-referendum-unions/.
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Assembly.39 6
B. Executive Branch Actions
Although presidents and state governors cannot stray beyond the
bounds of any relevant statute or constitution, executives still hold substantial authority over bargaining, both as the chief of the executive
branch and as the elected official who oversees the
operation of adminis3 97
law.
the
enforcing
of
charge
in
trative agencies
1. Executive Orders
Executive orders are powerful tools in shaping the law, particularly
when the legislature cannot or will not act.3 98 Presidents have used executive orders to unilaterally create, eliminate, expand, and limit labor rights
within their respective spheres of governance. 99 For example, the first
formal system of public sector collective bargaining was instituted by Executive Order 49 in 1958 by New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner,
Jr. 400 Similarly, the right of federal government employees to bargain collectively was originally the product of an executive order signed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962; several other executive orders on bargaining rights followed. 40 1 Those rights for federal employees were ultimately
enshrined in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute,
demonstrating the shaping force of the executive order as a tool to ultimately influence legislative action.40 2

396. See, e.g., Dylan Peers McCoy, Indiana education advocates demand boost to schoolfunding, teacher pay at Statehouse rally, Chalkbeat (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.chalk-

beat.org/posts/in/2019/04/16/indiana-education-advocates-demand-boost-to-school-funding-teacherpay-at-statehouse-rally/; Arika Herron, Teacher walkout possible in Indianaif GeneralAssembly ignores pay issue. 'We expect action in 2019.', Indianapolis Star (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/education/2018/12/1 0/indiana-general-assembly-teachers-keep-close-payplan/2266994002/.
397. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 308 (2009); 16A AM. JUR. 2d Con-

stitutional Law § 250 (2009).
398.
399.
cision,

Id. (Discussing Executive powers under the Constitution).
See Joe Davidson, AdministrationDefends Labor-Law Executive OrderAgainst CourtDeWASH.
POST
(Nov.
1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power-

post/wp/2016/1 1/01 /administration-defends-labor-law-executive-order-against-court-decision/?utm term=.7d398e378d56; see also Daveante Jones, A Review of President Trump's Executive
Orders Impacting Labor & Employment Law, HR PROFESSIONALS MAGAZINE, http://hrprofession-

alsmagazine.com/a-review-of-president-trumps-executive-orders-impacting-labor-employment-law/
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
400. Exec. Order No. 49, supra, note 66.
401. Exec. OrderNo. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 17, 1962); Exec. OrderNo. 11491, 34 Fed.
Reg. 17605 (Oct. 31, 1969); Exec. Order No. 11838, 40 Fed. Reg. 5743 (Feb. 7, 1975).
402. 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012).
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The Trump White House has continued the trend of trying to use executive orders to address federal employee bargaining matters.40 3 On May
25, 2018, the White House issued two executive orders related to federal
employee collective bargaining.40 4 The first imposed swift timelines for
negotiations and sought to limit, to some extent, the scope of bargaining. 40 5 The second order limited the paid hours spent on union related
matters, imposed agency approval requirements for deviations from those
limits, and instructed the Office of Personnel Management to assess
whether regulatory changes may be necessary to implement the rules set
forth in the order.40 6 On August 25, 2018, a majority of the provisions in
the order were declared invalid by a D.C. District judge.40 7 The judge
found that the enjoined portions reduced the scope of protected
collective
40 8
bargaining rights and "hampered good faith bargaining.
The use of executive power to implement labor policy is not confined
to the White House. 40 9 As noted above, Indiana governors both granted
and revoked the right of state employees to bargain by executive order.4 10
Indeed, Janus itself was brought against the backdrop of a 2015 executive
order by former Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner ending mandatory
agency fees for state employees. 41 1 There also have been more recent executive orders from governors. In 2017, Oregon Governor Kate Brown
signed an order that required the Department of Administrative Services
to conduct market studies of state employee wages to ensure that funds
appropriated for state employee salary increases are sufficient to support
market level wages.4 12 Also in 2017, Hawaii Governor David Ige signed

403. See Gregory Korte, Judge Rules Against Trump'sAttempt to Weaken FederalUnions, USA
TODAY (Aug. 25, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/25/donald-trump-labor-unions-court-strikes-down-three-executive-orders/1098451002/.
404. 2018 Donald Trump Executive Orders, OFF. OF FED. REG. (last visited Feb 2. 2019),
https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders/donald-trump/20 18;
see
also Jones, supra note 399.
405.
Exec. Order No. 13836, 83 Fed. Reg. 25329 (May 25, 2018) (Developing efficient, effective, and cost-reducing approaches to federal sector collective bargaining).
406. Exec. Order No. 13837, 83 Fed. Reg. 25335 (May 25, 2018).
407. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d 370, 381 (D.D.C.
2018) (Determining that the only parts of the orders that remain are Executive Order 13,836 § 5(c);

Executive Order 13,837 §§ 2(j), 4(c); and Executive Order 13,839 §§ 2(b), 2(c), 4(b)(iii), 7).
408. Id.at 440.
409.

After Janus: Blue States Move to Protect Public Workers, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers:

Media Ctr. (July 16, 2018), http://www.ibew.org/mediacenter/Articles/18Daily/1 807/180716.
410. Ind. Exec. Order No. 90-6, 13 Ind. Reg. 1925 (July 1, 1990); Ind. Exec. Order No. 97-8,
20 Ind. Reg. 2222 (May 1, 1997); Ind. Exec. Order No. 03-35, 27 Ind. Reg. 1007 (Dec. 1, 2003); Ind.
Exec. Order No. 05-14 (Jan. 11, 2005).
411.

Ill. Exec. Order No. 13-15 (Jan. 14, 2013).

412.

Or. Exec. Order No. 17-08 (Apr. 27, 2017).
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Executive Order 17-06, which adjusted the terms and conditions of employment for certain civil service employees excluded from the state's
public employee bargaining unit to bring them in line with those of their
unionized counterparts.4 13 Amid reports in the wake of Janus of individuals and organizations harassing union members or prospective union
members, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order
No. 183, which prohibited State entities from disclosing personal contact
information for state employees.414 Subsequently, the New York State
Legislature codified the terms of Executive Order No. 183 and made it
applicable to all public employers.41 5
While legislative bodies must sometimes wait several months to a
year for a legislative session before making changes in law, an executive
order can be drafted, signed, and issued quickly. 4 16 Therefore, look for
more executive orders to be issued by governors as a response to Janus,4t 7
or orders similar to President Trump's, in the event that legislatures cannot
or will not pass relevant legislation.
2. Administrative Agencies
While the bulk of power lies with state legislatures to determine public policy in response to Janus, state administrative agencies will play an
4 8
important role in interpreting and enforcing existing and new laws. "
Specifically, through rule-making and adjudication, administrative agencies and adjudicators will have the opportunity to neutralize or enhance
the impact of Janus.41 9
Janus and the ameliorative statutes discussed above are so recent that
there are not many rules to discuss. There are also only a few administrative agency decisions related to Janus.42 ° However, there has been some
speculation that there will be an increase in claims filed in administrative
agencies against employers after the end of agency fees. 421 This does not
413.
Haw. Exec. OrderNo. 17-06 (Oct. 31, 2017).
414. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 183 (June 27, 2018).
415.
NY Laws 2019, Ch. 55, Part E.
416. Michael S. Herman, GubernatorialExecutive Orders, 30 RUTGERS L. J. 987, 1021 (1999);
Aaron Blake, What is an Executive Order?And How Do PresidentTrump's Stack Up?, WASHINGTON
POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/27/what-is-an-executive-order-and-how-do-president-trumps-stack-up/?noredirect=on&utm tenn=.3ceae0 Iad751.
417. Barret & Greene, supra note 267.
418. See Benjamin Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 397-98 (2007).
419. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1913
(2013).
420. See, e.g., SEIU Healthcare Minn. and Chippewa County Montevideo Hosp., BMS 18-HN0415, 2018 WL 7569662 (MN BMS Oct. 8, 2018).
421.
Sarah Cudahy, Kate Luscombe, James Roemer & John Wirenius, Strategies for Adapting
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appear to have occurred in Indiana, Wisconsin, or Michigan, where union
pursuit of unfair labor practice claims or other enforcement actions before
the same or lower trajectory followadministrative agencies continued 4at
22
fees.
agency
of
ing the prohibition

Indiana Teacher Unfair Practice Cases:
Agency Fees Prohibited in 1995
30

25
20

10
5••
5

.

.

.

.....................................................................

I............. ... ....... .

..
..

..

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

States with a political divide between the executive branch and legislatures may prove to be particularly fertile ground for administrative
agency actions. Administrative agencies serve to demonstrate that the ultimate impact of Janus hinges on the multiple tiers of state and local
government and the interplay between them.423
C. The Courts' ContinuingRole: InterpretingJanus & Beyond
The courts' role in Janus does not end with the decision; in the wake
of Janus, challenges to new state laws and regulations promulgated in response to Janus are likely. 424 The court also left questions to be answered
to a Post-JanusWorld, in John F. Wirenius, ed., THE TAYLOR LAW AT 50: PUBLIC SECTOR
RELATIONS IN A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE, 183-211 (2019).
422. Id. at 187-189; Data collected or provided by the Indiana Education Employment Relations
Board on Mar. 20, 2018.
423. See Lisa Milam-Perez, Reaction Is Swift to Supreme Court's Janus Decision,
EMPLOYMENT LAW DAILY (July 2, 2018), https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/employment-lawdaily/reaction-is-swift-to-supreme-court-s-janus-decision/54835/ (discussing how state legislatures
are to respond to the decision).
424. See Daniel Wiessner, Right-to-Work Group Says It Will Sue States That Defy Ruling,
REUTERS (July 5, 2018, 7:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/labor-righttowork/right-to-work(discussing challenges to
group-says-it-will-sue-states-that-defy-janus-ruling-idUSLIN1UIOAB
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another day. The courts will also have to decide whether to extend the
rationale of Janus-andthe reversal of Abood-to other entities than unions and to other areas of the law.4 25 And the day Janus was handed down
also was the day Justice Kennedy-often described as the court's swing
vote-resigned.4 2 6 The fate of many of the cases described below may
well be determined by the new Justice, Brett Kavanaugh.
Unions and their supporters have argued that it is unfair for the union
to be required to pay to represent nonmembers who do not pay agency
fees or otherwise pay for representations.4 7 However, state courts to date
have disagreed, finding that charging fees or refusing to process grievances for nonmembers violates the exclusive representative's duty of fair
representation. 428
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that exclusive representatives
are required to represent members and nonmembers under the duty of fair
representation regardless of the existence of agency fees. 4 29 The union
argued that the obligations imposed by the duty of fair representation, in
the absence of obligatory agency fees, constituted a taking of the union's
property for the benefit of other private actors without just compensation.430 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the union failed to
overcome a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard when challenging the
state constitutional compliance of the state's right to work law.43 1 It held
that the duty of fair representation is an obligation that the unions volun432
tarily assume when they accept the role of exclusive representative.
The NLRB has also recently reaffirmed that even when employees do not
pay agency fees "a union may not charge nonmembers for processing of
grievances or other related services. 4 33

state laws passed in response to Janus).
425. See VICTORIA L. KILLION, PUBLIC SECTOR UNION DUES: GRAPPLING WITH FIXED STARS
AND STARE DECISIS (PART II) 1-2 (Cong. Res. Serv. ed. 2018).
426. See John Cassidy, As Kennedy Retires, The Supreme Court's Attack On Labor UnionsIs A
Sign of Things to Come, THE NEW YORKER (June 27, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ourcolumnists/as-kennedy-retires-the-supreme-courts-attack-on-labor-unions-is-a-sign-of-things-tocome (explaining that Justice Kennedy handed in his resignation on the same day that Janus was
decided).
427. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Dist. 10 & Its Local Lodge 106 v. State, 903 N.W.2d 141, 144
(Wis. Ct. App. 2017).
428. Id. at 149-50.

429.

Id. at 149.

430.

Id. at 148.

431.
432.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 150.

433.

United Steel Workers Local 1192, 12-CB-109657 (NLRB 2015).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court in Janus opined that unions voluntarily
assume the duty of fair representation.43 4 Further, it may be in a union's
best interest to represent nonmembers in grievance proceedings, in spite
of the costs of doing so, on the grounds that it "furthers the union's interest
in keeping control of the administration of the collective bargaining agreement ....
Nonetheless, as already noted, the Janus majority suggested that states could legislate a change in the duty of fair representations, finding that "nonmembers could be required to pay for [union
representation services] or could be denied union representation altogether," noting that precedent for such an approach already exists in some
states. 436 It seems then that the Justices recognize that the duty of fair representation is not constitutionally mandated, but almost purely a creature
of state law. 437 However, as not being a member is a constitutional right,
parties should be careful in negotiating as they may not negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement that discriminates in terms and conditions
of employment other than individual representation in discipline and:
grievances, against nonmembers-and the public employer must be care-.
ful not to adopt such an agreement.43 8
Laws, rules, or union policies making it more difficult to revoke union membership are also likely to be challenged. 439 The NLRB has interpreted the National Labor Relations Act to "prohibit categorically union
policies that 'delay or otherwise impede' a member's right to resign or
revoke., 440 However, some states have adopted a different public policy. 44 1 In New York, the Taylor Law was amended to make revocation
subject to the terms set forth in the dues deduction authorization." 2 The
Michigan Court of Appeals recently addressed the financial implications
of membership resignation.44 3 In affirming a decision of the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission the court found that, while the em-

434. Int'l Ass 'n of Machinists, 903 N.W.2d at 150.
435. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2468.
436. Id.
437. Id. ("It is questionable whether the Constitution would permit a public-sector employer to
adopt a collective-bargaining agreement that discriminates against nonmembers.").
438. Id.
439. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106-08 (1985).
440. Local 58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 888 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge 1414, 270 NLRB 1330, 1333 (1984)); see also Pattern Makers' League, 473 U.S. at 106-08 (finding that, under the NLRA, unions do not have the right
to "make rules restricting the right to resign").
441.
GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT, 7 (1966).

442.
443.

Id.
Teamsters Local 214 v. Beutler, No. 330854, 2017 WL 3441394, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.

Aug. 10, 2017), perm. app. denied, 908 N.W.2d 301 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2018).
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ployee had a right to immediate revocation of union membership, the employee was still responsible for previously agreed-upon dues until the end
of the dues period.444
The Janus decision has disrupted core First Amendment principles
concerning public employment. On the one hand, the Janus Court endorsed the Pickering-Connicktest and rationale that individual employee
grievances are not constitutionally protected, even when those employment related grievances may relate to a matter of public concern because
the interest of the governmental employer in effective administration often outweighs the employee's right to speak.44 5 However, Janus distinguishes Pickering-Connickfrom Abood, by drawing an arguably tenuous
distinction between the nature of the speech involved.4 46 Specifically, the
Court notes the private nature of individual employee grievances or issues
as juxtaposed by union speech in regard to collective bargaining, which
447
the Court notes as "overwhelmingly of substantial public concern.
The Court did not provide any test for this category of speech or the
448
appropriate level of scrutiny placed on government actions regulating it.
Rather, the majority leaves wholly unanswered when the scales tip between the private concern of an individual seeking a 5% raise and the
public concern of a union's request for a 5% raise for all employees it
represents. 449 Nor does the Court set forth what would be a narrowly tailored restriction on the individual right to abstain from or the collective
right to speak in the context of public bargaining, salaries, and payment.4 5 °
This ambiguity leaves governmental employers with limited flexibility or
guidance on what actions or limitations are permissible in the new universe of protected labor45 ' speech, beyond an individualized PickeringConnick analysis. Moreover, the Court's dicta will likely lead to legal
challenges against prohibitions or limitations regarding bargaining as constituting unlawful prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment.4 52

444. Id.at *1; see also Edwards v. Ind. State Teachers Ass'n, 749 N.E.2d 1220, 1220 (Ind.Ct.
App. 2001) (Fk-12upholding a teacher union's membership contract provision limiting members'
right to revoke to one month per year based on Abood).
445. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 383 (2011); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, at 411; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S.

563, at 568.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2457.
Id.at 2477.
Id.at 2477-78.
Id.at 2472-73.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2943-47 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id.at 2494-96 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2457.
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As to extending Janus, there is already pending litigation that may
be primed to extend the holding in Janus to the private sector, which
would eliminate agency fees entirely.4 53 Whether or not that effort is successful may turn on the threshold issue of whether the RLA regulatory
scheme and private sector agreements containing agency fee provisions
meet the requisite level of state action needed to implicate the First
Amendment.45 4 To date, union security clauses in a private sector collective bargaining agreement have not been held to be a state action.45 5 Nor
does the Court give any indication that it would find private sector fees
unconstitutional.4 56 In finding that A bood was wrongly decided, the Court
recognized that Congress authorizedprivate-sectoragency shops and that
"Abood failed to appreciate that a very different First Amendment question arises when a State requires its employees to pay agency fees. 457
Janus has implications that could reach far beyond the payment of fees
or the level of scrutiny for public sector work speech and down to the very
basis of collective bargaining itself.45 8 Given the Court's findings regarding public-sector employee rights to free speech and that negotiations involve matters of substantial public concern, it is possible that the realignment of the First Amendment under Janus could be construed broadly to
establish a constitutional right to bargain collectively. 459 However, a constitutional right to collectively bargain may necessarily imply a constitutional right to refrain from collectively bargaining, a conclusion that could
eviscerate the notion of exclusive representation and the end of the twentieth century model of United States labor law that is premised on a democratic form of governance.4 6 ° Infact, the Janus majority, in rejecting the"
union's originalist argument for preserving Abood, included a footnote
noting that collective bargaining under the common law had been treated
as an unlawful infringement on an employee's liberty of contract.4 61 The
Court, however, did not seem poised to further disturb the collective bargaining status quo.462 The Court noted that its intent was not to question
453.
See e.g., United Nurses and Allied Professionals, 359 NLRB 469 (2012).
454. Id.at 471.
455.
Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a ConstitutionalAnomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REv. 169, 184
(2015).
456. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459.
457. Id.
458.
See Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work andthe Right to Strike, 2017 U. CH. LEGAL F. 513,
534-36 (2017).
459. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 28, Sweeney v. Rauner, 1:18-CV-01362 (N.D. Il.Feb.
22, 2018). Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 25, Operating Engineers of Wisc. v.
Walker, (E.D. Wisc. Feb. 23, 2018).
460. See Estlund supra note 455, at 232.
461. Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2471, n.7 (citing Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-566 (1990)).
462. See id.at 2485.
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the foundations of labor and that aside from eliminating agency fees
"[s]tates can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as they are. 463
And so far, the Eighth Circuit, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
and other courts have dismissed the argument that exclusivity is unconstitutional.4 64
Although the Court did not indicate an intention to eliminate collective
bargaining, it did indicate some hostility to it, at least to public sector bargaining.46 5 Much like the policy aims of the executive branch, judicial
policy goals and predilections will similarly shape whether judicial outcomes are favorable or unfavorable to organized labor.466 As an example,
prior to Janus, Wisconsin's 2011 changes in its public collective bargaining mandated recertification of unions annually. 467 In February 2018, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a new rule of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission's, under which the failure to timely file paperwork for a recertification election results in decertification of the exclusive representative for the next year.46 8
The Abood rationale has been relied upon in many cases other than
public sector agency fees. 469 By overruling Abood entirely, rather than
merely narrowing its scope as Harrisdid, Janus may have future consequences for the underlying rationale supporting other instances of compulsory payment required by law, like state bar association dues, university student activity fees, and compelled advertising. 470 Although Harris
463. Id.at 2485, n.27.
464. See, e.g., Branch v. CERB, 2019 WL 1522991 (Mass. Apr. 9, 2019); Bierman v. Dayton,
900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 WL 2078110, (May 13, 2019); Crockett,
F.Supp.3d., 2019 WL 1212082, at *8 (D. Alaska Mar. 14, 2019).
465. Id. at 2483 ("Unsustainable collective bargaining agreements have also been blamed for
multiple municipal bankruptcies."); see also id. at 2486 ("It is hard to estimate how many billions of
dollars have been taken from nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the
First Amendment.").
466. Lawrence Hurley & Robert lafolla, Conservative Supreme CourtJustices Take Aim at Union Fee, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018, 9:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-unions/conservative-supreme-court-justices-take-aim-at-union-fees-idUSKCN1 GAl VB.
467. See Wis. STAT. § 11 1.70(4)3.(d)3.b. (2017); see also WiS. STAT. § 111.83(3)(b) (2015).
468. Wis. Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 907 N.W.2d 425, 43940 (Feb. 28, 2018).
469. Harris, 134 S.Ct. at 2638; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth,
533 U.S. 217, 221 (2000) (finding compulsory student activity fees implicated the First Amendment,
but that viewpoint neutrality in dispersing the compulsory fees insulated the fees; therefore the content
neutrality element is more likely to remain unaffected by Janus and continue as reaffirmed in Harris);
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (finding compulsory dues constitutional because the
regulation of the practice of law is a competing governmental interest); but see United States v. United
Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001) (holding that compelled fees for mushroom producers to pay for
advertising unconstitutional under Abood and Keller will presumably remain unaffected by Janus'
more stringent standard).
470. See Harris, 134 U.S. at 2638; see also Southworth, 533 U.S. at 221; Keller, 496 U.S. at 13;
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found both instances of fees to continue to satisfy compelling governmental interests, the majority in Janus does not address compelled fees beyond
the specific case, while the dissent notes repeatedly that the cases involving compelled fees all rely foundationally on Abood.47 1 Nevertheless, it
would appear that the government interest in regulating certain industries,
such as attorneys, may continue to justify the imposition of mandatory
fees.472

Both the majority and the dissent discuss stare decisis at length.4 73
And although both the majority and dissent discuss the same five factors,
they come to opposite conclusions on every one.4 74 The first factor discussed by the majority is whether the opinion at issue is well reasoned.4 75
However, relying on whether the opinion is well reasoned potentially "dilutes the constraining, stabilizing effect of precedent and increases the
chances that constitutional law will ebb and flow with shifts in judicial
personnel-and attendant shifts in the interpretive methodologies that enjoy primacy at any given moment., 476 Such argument was noted in the
dissents of both Janus and Citizens United.477 Indeed, President Reagan's
former solicitor general agrees, finding that looking back at the Roberts'
Court's failure to invoke stare decisis in such cases as Janus and Citizens
United, as well as other cases including voter suppression and affirmative
action, means that the Court has reversed "settlements that work tolerably
well. 4 78 It also means that we cannot know how far the reverberations of
Janus will go.

-

CONCLUSION

For the last 40 years, agency fees have been considered a constitutionally permissible limitation on employees' First Amendment rights on

but see UnitedFoods, 533 U.S. at 415.
471. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2497-98.
472. Keller, 496 U.S. at 13.
473. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2497-2501(Kagan, J., dissenting).
474. Id. at 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
475.
Id. at 2497-98, 2497, n.4 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
476. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and ConstitutionalStructure, 112 Nw. U. L. REv. 789, 824-25
(2018).
477.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 408-09 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[If staredecisis] is to do any meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at least
demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences of five Justices, for overturning settled
doctrine. '[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that

a prior case was wrongly decided."').
478.

Charles Fried, Not Conservative,HARV. L. REv. BLOG (July 3, 2018), https://blog.harvard-

lawreview.org/not-conservative/.
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the basis that the government maintains a compelling interest in promoting harmonious labor relations.4 79 With Janus, the Court reversed course
and declared that agency fees no longer met the compelling interest
threshold and therefore are a violation of the First Amendment.4 8 ° Janus
is important, not merely because of its prohibition of public sector agency
fees, but because of the responses it will progenerate from stakeholders
and governmental units throughout the country.
The immediate impact of Janus is not the end of public sector collective bargaining. Indeed, the number of contracts impacted are fewer
than one might think, as many states had already prohibited agency fees
pre-Janus. The durability and longevity of public sector collective bargaining will likely remain with the executive and legislative branches of
the state and federal governments as impacted by the activism of public
employees and their unions. The decline in revenue for unions, however,
could likely undermine the effectiveness of labor representation at the bargaining table, in the workplace, and before legislative bodies.
Janus has brought public sector bargaining back squarely into the
public debate.481 A number of states have passed or are in the process of
passing ameliorative legislation attempting to soften the impact of the
agency fee prohibition and redefming the duties of exclusive representatives.482 Other states will likely follow this trend, with legislation as well
as executive orders, administrative rules, administrative decisions, and
ballot measures. Still, other states will follow the opposite path, restricting the scope of bargaining or adding recertification requirements for exclusive representatives.
Courts will likely be asked to determine the role of the exclusive
representative, the unions' duty of fair representation, or interpret the
aforementioned new laws, rules, and orders impacting bargaining. Aside
from the collective bargaining arena, state and federal courts will also
4 83
have to decide how to address cases that previously relied upon Abood.
In sum, like other seminal cases, the impact of Janus'rippleeffects
may very well comprise a total eclipse of the opinion itself.

479. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
480. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487.
481.
Daniel DiSalvo, Janus Barely Dents Public-Sector Union Membership, WALL ST. J. (FEB.
13,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/j anus-barely-dents-public-sector-union-membership11550100582.
482. After Janus: Blue States Move to ProtectPublic Workers, supra note 409; see also Barrett
& Greene, supra note 267.
483. See generally Harris,134 S. Ct. at 2638; Keller, 496 U.S. at 13.
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